Officials on Wednesday said this week's attack on a police station in China's far western Xinjiang region had been “masterminded” by terrorist groups, while security analysts here suggested separatist groups active in Pakistan had a role in the violence.
Officials raised the death toll from Monday's attack in Hotan, a city in southern Xinjiang, to 18. While police shot down 14 “rioters”, four others, including two women, were killed in the attack.
Hou Hanmin, the head of the regional information office in Hotan, told The Hindu in a telephone interview that the attackers were “organised”, and armed with knives and grenades.
The rioters had entered a nearby government office before attacking and setting fire to a police station. They had taken six hostages before the police shot 14 of the 18 reported attackers, according to official accounts.
“They held up a banner calling for ‘holy war',” said Ms. Hou. “The attack was brutal and ruthless. This was clearly an attack masterminded by terrorist groups.”
Xinjiang has seen intermittent unrest with clashes between the local Uighur ethnic group and the increasing number of Han Chinese, the country's majority ethnic group, who have migrated to the region in recent years. The government has, in the past, blamed Uighur separatist groups for the clashes, though many Uighurs say tensions had been driven by rising inequalities between the groups.
On Wednesday, government-run newspapers quoted terrorism experts as saying the attacks were carried out by separatists, likely linked to terror groups active in Pakistan. Xinjiang shares a border with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
“Located in the southern part of Xinjiang, Hotan is close to the border with Pakistan. Due to their affinity in religion and language, some Uighur residents there are at risk of being influenced by terrorist groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Pan Zhiping, director of the Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, told the Communist Party-run Global Times.
He said Hotan “appears prone to the influence of terrorism that has penetrated the country from overseas”.
Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), told the same newspaper that “signs have shown that the rioters were greatly influenced by overseas terrorist organisations”.
The East Turkestan separatist movement was “very active on the soil of Pakistan”, Zhao Gancheng, a South Asia scholar at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told The Hindu. But China and Pakistan, he said, had kept “good communications on this issue”.
Ms. Hou said the investigation was “on-going”. The national counter-terrorism office had dispatched a working team to Hotan.
“There is no sign that this incident is linked to any Pakistan-based terrorist groups,” she said.
But overseas Uighur groups questioned the government's version of events. An exiled Uighur group called the World Uyghur Congress said on Wednesday this week's clash was sparked by a protest by local residents who had called on the police to release information about their missing relatives, believed to be in police custody.
Ms. Hou, however, said there had been no protest earlier this week.
She rejected reports that the attack was an ethnic conflict. “Both Han and Uighur people were hurt,” she said. An Uighur security guard and an Uighur police officer were among those killed by the attackers.
“This was not a clash between ethnic groups, and has done enormous damage to the local community.”
Many Uighur groups have, in the past, accused the government of portraying local protests and ethnic unrest as being driven by separatist groups in order to justify security clampdowns.
In 2009, the government blamed overseas groups for orchestrating ethnic riots between Uighurs and Han Chinese in the city of Urumqi, which left more than 197 people dead. However, dozens of the city's residents, in interviews with The Hindu last year, blamed long-standing distrust between both ethnic groups, driven by increasing migration and rising inequalities, as sparking ethnic tensions.
Earlier: napaki.tumblr.com
Twitter handle: @napaki
Read the original article by clicking on the respective post titles
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
#pakistan is now an institutionalized Al Qaeda #terrorism
Write it off, Pakistan has cooked its goose – stepped way over the line. The awkward relationship has moved further to one of state enemy than ally. The only thing slowing down catastrophe is Pakistan’s own incompetence.
“Al-Qaeda’s terrorist tool kit now includes training manuals from Pakistani spy agency
By Greg Miller
After losing key rounds in what some al-Qaeda operatives call the “intelligence war,” the terrorist network has introduced a new online course in operational security with material from an unusual source: Pakistan’s powerful spy service.
The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate has long been accused of coddling militant groups, even while helping the CIA kill or capture dozens of senior al-Qaeda operatives including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Now al-Qaeda operatives can study directly from some of the ISI’s training manuals, according to a new report by Abdul Hameed Bakier at The Jamestown Foundation.
It’s not clear how the terrorist network got its hands on the documents, which were posted on jihadi Internet forums by al-Qaeda’s Global Islamic Media Front.
The course starts with an introduction to basic espionage terms, then moves into ways to screen potential mujaheddin members. They “should be Muslims, enjoy a certain degree of education and be religiously motivated and ‘non-mundane,’ ” according to the Jamestown synopsis. Subsequent classes deal with secure communications in the age of the Internet and mobile phones. (Bottom line: avoid them.)
There’s even an advanced course on “deep cover,” or the use of intricately fabricated false identities to penetrate the enemy. Most disconcerting of all, Jamestown notes, is that the courses were translated from Urdu to English “for the benefit of mujahideen in America and Europe ... an indication of where the mujahideen are planning their future terror attacks.
Monday, July 18, 2011
Sikh community in #pakistan prevented from celebrating festival #persecution
The Sikh community in the eastern city of Lahore has been barred from organising a religious celebration at a disputed gurdwara after a religious group persuaded authorities that celebrating the Muslim holy day of 'Shab-e-Barat' is more important than the Sikh festival.
The musical equipment of the Sikhs was thrown out and their entry to the gurdwara barred due to the efforts of the Dawat-e-Islami, a Barelvi proselytising group, The Express Tribune newspaper reported today.
Police were deployed outside the gurdwara to prevent Sikhs from conducting a religious ceremony until after the end of Shab-e-Barat, which falls tomorrow.
The Sikh community wanted to commemorate an eighteenth-century saint at the gurdwara on Friday.
Gurdwara Shaheed Bhai Taru Singh at Naulakha Bazaar in Lahore was built to honour the memory of a Sikh saint who was executed in 1745 on the orders of the Mughal governor of Punjab, Zakaria Khan.
Every July, Sikhs have held religious ceremonies to commemorate his sacrifice.
Though the gudwara was taken over by the Evacuee Trust Property Board after Partition, Sikhs were allowed to continue using it with relatively few restrictions.
Four years ago, the Dawat-e-Islami claimed the gurdwara was located on the site of the grave of a 15th century Muslim saint, Pir Shah Kaku.
The group claimed Kaku was the grandson of Baba Fariduddin Ganjshakar, an "implausible claim" since Ganjshakar died in 1280 while it claims that Kaku died almost 200 years later, in 1477, the daily reported.
The Sikh community had approached ETPB, which allowed both communities to observe their religious rituals according to their own beliefs at the gurdwara.
The Dawat-e-Islami used it every Thursday for prayer services while Sikhs used it once a year for the anniversary of Taru Singh's martyrdom.
This year, when Sikh men went in to set up their musical instruments on July 13, they were thrown out by men from Dawat-e-Islami and prevented from re-entering the shrine.
Members of the Sikh community, many of whom fear to be identified, said the leader of the group of men, Sohail Butt, claimed that the gurdwara was now a mosque and Sikhs would not be allowed to bring in their musical instruments any longer.
Butt admitted he had prevented Sikhs from performing their ritual, claiming that the gurdwara was inside the courtyard of the mosque.
"Shab-e-Barat is more important than the Sikh ritual," Butt said, adding the ETPB had accepted his group's stance.
Officials from ETPB admit that they have asked the Sikh community to postpone their celebrations until after Shab-e-Barat.
ETPB Deputy Administrator Faraz Abbas, who deals with Sikh affairs across Pakistan, admitted that Sikhs had been denied entry into the gurdwara.
Gurunanak Mission president Sardar Bishon Singh said the ETPB's decision to bar Sikhs from entering their shrine was against the constitution.
He said that he approached the ETPB but was told to wait until after Shab-e-Barat.
"How can we postpone the rituals of our faith," he asked, adding that the government was not paying attention to their cause.
Singh appealed to Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to take suo moto action over the violation of rights of minorities in Pakistan.
The musical equipment of the Sikhs was thrown out and their entry to the gurdwara barred due to the efforts of the Dawat-e-Islami, a Barelvi proselytising group, The Express Tribune newspaper reported today.
Police were deployed outside the gurdwara to prevent Sikhs from conducting a religious ceremony until after the end of Shab-e-Barat, which falls tomorrow.
The Sikh community wanted to commemorate an eighteenth-century saint at the gurdwara on Friday.
Gurdwara Shaheed Bhai Taru Singh at Naulakha Bazaar in Lahore was built to honour the memory of a Sikh saint who was executed in 1745 on the orders of the Mughal governor of Punjab, Zakaria Khan.
Every July, Sikhs have held religious ceremonies to commemorate his sacrifice.
Though the gudwara was taken over by the Evacuee Trust Property Board after Partition, Sikhs were allowed to continue using it with relatively few restrictions.
Four years ago, the Dawat-e-Islami claimed the gurdwara was located on the site of the grave of a 15th century Muslim saint, Pir Shah Kaku.
The group claimed Kaku was the grandson of Baba Fariduddin Ganjshakar, an "implausible claim" since Ganjshakar died in 1280 while it claims that Kaku died almost 200 years later, in 1477, the daily reported.
The Sikh community had approached ETPB, which allowed both communities to observe their religious rituals according to their own beliefs at the gurdwara.
The Dawat-e-Islami used it every Thursday for prayer services while Sikhs used it once a year for the anniversary of Taru Singh's martyrdom.
This year, when Sikh men went in to set up their musical instruments on July 13, they were thrown out by men from Dawat-e-Islami and prevented from re-entering the shrine.
Members of the Sikh community, many of whom fear to be identified, said the leader of the group of men, Sohail Butt, claimed that the gurdwara was now a mosque and Sikhs would not be allowed to bring in their musical instruments any longer.
Butt admitted he had prevented Sikhs from performing their ritual, claiming that the gurdwara was inside the courtyard of the mosque.
"Shab-e-Barat is more important than the Sikh ritual," Butt said, adding the ETPB had accepted his group's stance.
Officials from ETPB admit that they have asked the Sikh community to postpone their celebrations until after Shab-e-Barat.
ETPB Deputy Administrator Faraz Abbas, who deals with Sikh affairs across Pakistan, admitted that Sikhs had been denied entry into the gurdwara.
Gurunanak Mission president Sardar Bishon Singh said the ETPB's decision to bar Sikhs from entering their shrine was against the constitution.
He said that he approached the ETPB but was told to wait until after Shab-e-Barat.
"How can we postpone the rituals of our faith," he asked, adding that the government was not paying attention to their cause.
Singh appealed to Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to take suo moto action over the violation of rights of minorities in Pakistan.
Book Review: Playing With Fire: #pakistan at War With Itself
America’s long, troubled relationship with Pakistan is now in a deadly downward spiral with no end in sight. An excellent new book by Pamela Constable, Playing With Fire: Pakistan at War With Itself, provides keen insights into Pakistani politics and society, and most important, elucidates the costs of America’s drone operations on the future of the relationship between Washington and Islamabad.
All this year there’s been bad news. Distrust is rampant. The Obama administration’s deep misgivings about Pakistan’s Army was dramatically illustrated when it sent the SEALs to get bin Laden, and only called Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani when they were safely back in Afghan airspace.
It’s easy to get frustrated and angry with Pakistan, but that’s not policy. When dealing with the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, we need a coherent and effective approach. A first step is to understand Pakistan. Fortunately, Constable has given us an excellent and timely introduction.
Based on years of reporting in South Asia, her book captures the maze of contradictions and conspiracies that make Pakistan the world’s most dangerous country. Her portraits of Pakistanis, including one of Kayani, are crisp and cogent. She properly emphasizes the enormous shadow one of his predecessors, Ronald Reagan’s friend Zia ul Huq, still casts across the country 30 years later. Zia was a jihadist and true believer, and with our help created a monster that is now fighting for Pakistan’s soul. If there is another coup by a Zia-type general, extremists will control the fifth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet.
Pakistan’s many problems are only likely to get worse. Half the population is under 15 years old; they face a jobless future in which the lure of radical Islam is only likely to grow. Hatred of America runs deep. Each side often disappoints the other. Both pursue narrow, short-term interests at the expense of longer-term partnership. Great “secret” projects, like the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, have played a disproportional role in the relationship.
Now there is a new project: the drones, which fuel anti-Americanism every day. Constable reports that the drones “beyond any other real or imagined provocation have most inflamed Pakistani emotions against the United States.” Their psychological impact is “so disproportionate the CIA might as well have dropped an atom bomb on Karachi during rush hour.” Covert operations have unintended blowback that may have implications for decades to come. The sad rhythm of Pakistani-American relations keeps repeating itself.
All this year there’s been bad news. Distrust is rampant. The Obama administration’s deep misgivings about Pakistan’s Army was dramatically illustrated when it sent the SEALs to get bin Laden, and only called Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani when they were safely back in Afghan airspace.
It’s easy to get frustrated and angry with Pakistan, but that’s not policy. When dealing with the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, we need a coherent and effective approach. A first step is to understand Pakistan. Fortunately, Constable has given us an excellent and timely introduction.
Based on years of reporting in South Asia, her book captures the maze of contradictions and conspiracies that make Pakistan the world’s most dangerous country. Her portraits of Pakistanis, including one of Kayani, are crisp and cogent. She properly emphasizes the enormous shadow one of his predecessors, Ronald Reagan’s friend Zia ul Huq, still casts across the country 30 years later. Zia was a jihadist and true believer, and with our help created a monster that is now fighting for Pakistan’s soul. If there is another coup by a Zia-type general, extremists will control the fifth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet.
Pakistan’s many problems are only likely to get worse. Half the population is under 15 years old; they face a jobless future in which the lure of radical Islam is only likely to grow. Hatred of America runs deep. Each side often disappoints the other. Both pursue narrow, short-term interests at the expense of longer-term partnership. Great “secret” projects, like the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, have played a disproportional role in the relationship.
Now there is a new project: the drones, which fuel anti-Americanism every day. Constable reports that the drones “beyond any other real or imagined provocation have most inflamed Pakistani emotions against the United States.” Their psychological impact is “so disproportionate the CIA might as well have dropped an atom bomb on Karachi during rush hour.” Covert operations have unintended blowback that may have implications for decades to come. The sad rhythm of Pakistani-American relations keeps repeating itself.
High-tech system to track US staff on risky tours like #pakistan [post-Raymond Davis kidnapping??]
The State Department is installing advanced, classified security systems in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen to monitor staff movements in those countries where moving among local populations remains dangerous, according to department budget and contract documents.
The Blue Force Tracker system uses a small transmitter mounted on a vehicle, an aircraft or an individual that sends continuous signals to a Global Positioning System satellite and back to a computer in a secure command post. The command post computer shows precise locations within a 10-foot radius of tracked individuals, vehicles or aircraft on ever-changing map displays.
“This critical technology provides department personnel with the confidence to travel into highly dangerous areas, knowing there is an over-watch and a reaction capability to help them at the push of a button,” according to a State Department fiscal 2012 budget document presented to Congress. About $9.4 million was being sought to support the tracking system in Iraq next year.
No State Department official would discuss the systems on the record. A department spokesman, speaking on the condition of anonymity because security issues were involved, said last week: “The State Department uses all available options, including technology, to ensure the safety of our personnel. For reasons of operational security, we do not comment on what technologies the department employs, nor in which countries these technologies may be used.”
Four highly secure modular metal buildings are being built in Louisiana under a $23.1 million non-bid contract. When shipped to Iraq, they are to become the temporary operation centers holding Blue Force Tracker systems for two new embassy branches in Mosul and Kirkuk and two other facilities in Baghdad.
The new system will have “three-dimensional geospatial imagery and the ability to rapidly overlay analytic information onto maps,” say State Department budget documents. It also will allow the receipt of one-way messages, including distress calls, according to Thermopylae Sciences and Technology (TST), an Arlington-based company that helped develop the system for the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.
The TST system also allows users to “create and manage intelligence reports or incident reports and easily import and export this information,” which permits “data-driven route analysis, threat assessments, trend analysis and intelligence summaries,” the firm says.
In addition, a $15 million classified facility to hold the tracking system is being assembled on the U.S. Embassy grounds in Islamabad, Pakistan. An advertisement posted in June by Olgoonik Development seeks a security specialist to work there for the Blue Force Tracker program.
The Pakistan system is “designed to maximize visualization of designated assets traveling and conducting operations in hostile or hazardous areas,” according to the advertisement. One job of the specialist is to “track and report all off-compound embassy travelers to the [State Department] regional security officer . . . using the BFT-ONE [Blue Force Tracker] system.”
Similar Olgoonik advertisements sought security specialists to work on Blue Force Tracker systems being put in Yemen and Afghanistan. Each of the Olgoonik ads said the prospective hires must be U.S. citizens, have top-secret security clearances and be able to qualify for sensitive compartmented information, the category that applies to electronically intercepted intelligence.
While the Diplomatic Security Service has used the Blue Force Tracker in Iraq for six years to monitor vehicles carrying Foreign Service and other personnel, its primary purpose was to document activities of contract security guards. A 2008 report to top State Department officials, in the wake of Blackwater guards shooting several Iraqi civilians between 2005 and 2007, talked of video recording devices being installed in vehicles and the retention of tracker data.
The trackers then, according to the report, “combined with reporting requirements and established operational procedures allow for COM [chief of mission] motorcades to be monitored and held accountable.”
In contrast, the State Department’s fiscal 2012 budget document calls the system “critical to the life safety of COM personnel by allowing the security officer to monitor their location within three meters [10 feet] and respond to any incident with pinpoint accuracy.”
The Blue Force Tracker system uses a small transmitter mounted on a vehicle, an aircraft or an individual that sends continuous signals to a Global Positioning System satellite and back to a computer in a secure command post. The command post computer shows precise locations within a 10-foot radius of tracked individuals, vehicles or aircraft on ever-changing map displays.
“This critical technology provides department personnel with the confidence to travel into highly dangerous areas, knowing there is an over-watch and a reaction capability to help them at the push of a button,” according to a State Department fiscal 2012 budget document presented to Congress. About $9.4 million was being sought to support the tracking system in Iraq next year.
No State Department official would discuss the systems on the record. A department spokesman, speaking on the condition of anonymity because security issues were involved, said last week: “The State Department uses all available options, including technology, to ensure the safety of our personnel. For reasons of operational security, we do not comment on what technologies the department employs, nor in which countries these technologies may be used.”
Four highly secure modular metal buildings are being built in Louisiana under a $23.1 million non-bid contract. When shipped to Iraq, they are to become the temporary operation centers holding Blue Force Tracker systems for two new embassy branches in Mosul and Kirkuk and two other facilities in Baghdad.
The new system will have “three-dimensional geospatial imagery and the ability to rapidly overlay analytic information onto maps,” say State Department budget documents. It also will allow the receipt of one-way messages, including distress calls, according to Thermopylae Sciences and Technology (TST), an Arlington-based company that helped develop the system for the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.
The TST system also allows users to “create and manage intelligence reports or incident reports and easily import and export this information,” which permits “data-driven route analysis, threat assessments, trend analysis and intelligence summaries,” the firm says.
In addition, a $15 million classified facility to hold the tracking system is being assembled on the U.S. Embassy grounds in Islamabad, Pakistan. An advertisement posted in June by Olgoonik Development seeks a security specialist to work there for the Blue Force Tracker program.
The Pakistan system is “designed to maximize visualization of designated assets traveling and conducting operations in hostile or hazardous areas,” according to the advertisement. One job of the specialist is to “track and report all off-compound embassy travelers to the [State Department] regional security officer . . . using the BFT-ONE [Blue Force Tracker] system.”
Similar Olgoonik advertisements sought security specialists to work on Blue Force Tracker systems being put in Yemen and Afghanistan. Each of the Olgoonik ads said the prospective hires must be U.S. citizens, have top-secret security clearances and be able to qualify for sensitive compartmented information, the category that applies to electronically intercepted intelligence.
While the Diplomatic Security Service has used the Blue Force Tracker in Iraq for six years to monitor vehicles carrying Foreign Service and other personnel, its primary purpose was to document activities of contract security guards. A 2008 report to top State Department officials, in the wake of Blackwater guards shooting several Iraqi civilians between 2005 and 2007, talked of video recording devices being installed in vehicles and the retention of tracker data.
The trackers then, according to the report, “combined with reporting requirements and established operational procedures allow for COM [chief of mission] motorcades to be monitored and held accountable.”
In contrast, the State Department’s fiscal 2012 budget document calls the system “critical to the life safety of COM personnel by allowing the security officer to monitor their location within three meters [10 feet] and respond to any incident with pinpoint accuracy.”
#Chinas's gift to tackle terrorism in #pakistan lying unused
A gift of expensive knitting machines from China for militancy-hit people of Pakistan's Khyber Pakthunkhwa province is lying unused for over a year due to lack of trained manpower.
The provincial directorate of technical education and manpower is now hunting for experts to run the machines and other equipment.
Besides knitting machines, China also gifted heavy machinery worth millions of rupees.
Sources told the daily Dawn that the provincial government had requested China to donate heavy machinery for reconstruction activities to rehabilitate institutions that were impacted due to insurgency.
China sent a consignment, including 20 knitting machines of industrial specification. One machine weighed 3,000 kg and a problem was faced in transporting it to Malakand.
Officials said that the directorate had sought training-cum-production knitting machines to train manpower while China had sent industrial level machines.
"Beggars can't be choosers. Therefore, we can't send the machines back to China," an official was quoted as saying.
The provincial directorate of technical education and manpower is now hunting for experts to run the machines and other equipment.
Besides knitting machines, China also gifted heavy machinery worth millions of rupees.
Sources told the daily Dawn that the provincial government had requested China to donate heavy machinery for reconstruction activities to rehabilitate institutions that were impacted due to insurgency.
China sent a consignment, including 20 knitting machines of industrial specification. One machine weighed 3,000 kg and a problem was faced in transporting it to Malakand.
Officials said that the directorate had sought training-cum-production knitting machines to train manpower while China had sent industrial level machines.
"Beggars can't be choosers. Therefore, we can't send the machines back to China," an official was quoted as saying.
Fearing for their life, Transporters in #pakistan keep their vehicles off road soon after sun set
ISLAMABAD, Jul 17 (APP): The people of twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad, specially the passengers are facing great hardship as the owners of the public transport plying between the two cities were keeping their vehicles off the road soon after the sun set.A large number of the passengers who are working specially in the Federal Capital have complained that public transporters of route-1 and route-3 have made it their habit of keeping their vehicles off the road soon after sun set and only a few vehicles are plying on the routes leaving the passengers at the mercy of taxi cabs. The Islamabad Traffic Police which is considered to be one of the efficient traffic police forces seen to be hapless before these powerful public transporters. Passengers have also complained that public transporters are overstaying their vehicles at various bus stops specially at Faizabad causing inconvenience to the travellers in hot summer days. “When we ask the drivers of the public transports to operate their vehicles and dont overstay, they resort to misbehave the passengers”, Chaudhry Ahmed Waqar a government servant and a frequent user of the public transport told APP. The passengers have appealed the concerned authorities to tame the drivers of the private transport and direct them to operate their vehicles in the evening and action should be taken against the violators.
#pPakistan lose hockey match & series against Netherlands
KARACHI: Pakistan lost the series to Netherlands after losing in Amsterdam on Saturday in the second match of the two-match series.
Netherlands opened the scoring before Sohail Abbas equalised for the Green Shirts through a penalty. However, Pakistan conceded a goal in the dying minutes to hand the Dutch a series victory.
The national team returns to Pakistan on Monday to begin preparing for their next assignment which is the Asian Hockey Championship.
Netherlands opened the scoring before Sohail Abbas equalised for the Green Shirts through a penalty. However, Pakistan conceded a goal in the dying minutes to hand the Dutch a series victory.
The national team returns to Pakistan on Monday to begin preparing for their next assignment which is the Asian Hockey Championship.
#pakistan becoming politically, economically insignificant
slamabad: The Pakistan Economy Watch (PEW) on Sunday said economy of the country is going down by the passage of every day which calls for urgent and decisive actions by the government.
Incompetent leadership and policies without logical or meaningful connection have left country astray while preserving credibility has become a big challenge for the government, it said.
Doubts, uncertainty, panic and pain has become part of the life for commoners as well as business community, said Dr. Murtaza Mughal, President PEW.
Loss of confidence is a very serious issue taken lightly by the politicians while the experience shows that it is impossible for a country to regain the faith of market once lost.
To avoid such an outcome, our leaders must act boldly and swiftly through parliament to boost anaemic growth rate, said Dr. Murtaza Mughal.
Islamabad urgently needs to send a clear message to convince international community and investors that government is now serious to introduce radical structural reforms.
Dr. Murtaza Mughal said that unpopular reforms will take time to produce results but will restore the market’s confidence which is dwindling due to impression that rulers are willing to risk everything to prolong rule and protect personal wealth.
Dr. Mughal said that current circumstances are leading country towards unsustainability raising serious challenges to our independence.
In this scenario, economic sustainability should be on the top of the government’s agenda as plunging into political and economic insignificance may leave Pakistan with no option but to accept Indian dominance, he warned.
Incompetent leadership and policies without logical or meaningful connection have left country astray while preserving credibility has become a big challenge for the government, it said.
Doubts, uncertainty, panic and pain has become part of the life for commoners as well as business community, said Dr. Murtaza Mughal, President PEW.
Loss of confidence is a very serious issue taken lightly by the politicians while the experience shows that it is impossible for a country to regain the faith of market once lost.
To avoid such an outcome, our leaders must act boldly and swiftly through parliament to boost anaemic growth rate, said Dr. Murtaza Mughal.
Islamabad urgently needs to send a clear message to convince international community and investors that government is now serious to introduce radical structural reforms.
Dr. Murtaza Mughal said that unpopular reforms will take time to produce results but will restore the market’s confidence which is dwindling due to impression that rulers are willing to risk everything to prolong rule and protect personal wealth.
Dr. Mughal said that current circumstances are leading country towards unsustainability raising serious challenges to our independence.
In this scenario, economic sustainability should be on the top of the government’s agenda as plunging into political and economic insignificance may leave Pakistan with no option but to accept Indian dominance, he warned.
"If we withhold that aid, I fear #pakistan might quit pretending to be our ally"
Also,
"Take that, Pakistan! Feel the stinging rebuke of receiving only $1.2 billion of U.S. taxpayer money for your ineffective, crooked military!"
Saturday, July 16, 2011
80% of #pakistan's budget speeches termed irrelevant
Evaluating the performance of the National Assembly of Pakistan during Budget Session 2011, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, MNA, has said that approximately 80% of the budget speeches were on non-budget issues.
He was speaking at the Citizens Forum on Performance of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan: Budget Session 2011-2012, which was organised by PILDAT to analyse the Budget Session Performance of the 13th National Assembly. Abbasi said that quality of the debate was poor “and only few members of the National Assembly understand the Budgetary Process, therefore, budget remains a mystery for most of the members.” “Besides, parliamentary leaders fail to educate their members about the budgetary process,” he added.
Abbasi said that the Finance Minister himself most of the time was absent during the budget debates and he hardly attended any session except budget presentation day.
Other speakers at the Forum included Abdul Rashid Godil, MNA, Wazir Ahmed Jogezai, Former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly; Abdullah Yousaf, Former Chairman Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director of PILDAT.
Presenting an analysis based on PILDAT Citizens’ Report on Performance of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan: Budget Session 2011-2012, Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director PILDAT said that the Federal Budget 2011-2012, tabled in the National Assembly on June 3, 2011 and passed on June 22, 2011 lasted for a dismal 17 actual working days. There was a 16% drop in time consumed in budget debate 2011 compared to 2008; total 35 hours consumed in Budget process in National Assembly compared to 41.6 in 2008. The decade long average of budget sessions from 1998 to 2011 is 12 days while in comparison, in our neighbouring country India, the Parliamentary Budget Process spans over 75 days.
Unlike the practice in other developing as well as mature parliamentary democracies, Standing Committees in Pakistan are not allowed any role to scrutinise departmentally related estimates or demands for grants and therefore no meaningful input is made in the Budget. Mehboob said that while the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab has instituted a Pre-Budget Session every year from January to February, the National Assembly, despite understanding the need to do so in order to allow members to make an input into budget making and priorities, has failed to institute the tradition of a Pre-Budget Session.
Mehboob said that a sharp decline is witnessed in the number of members of the National Assembly participating in the budget debate over the last 4 years of the 13th National Assembly as 39% less MNAs spoke in 2011 compared to 2008. In 2008 budget session, a total of 229 members participated in the budget debate whereas only 139 members participated during the 2011 budget session. The dwindling number of participants may be indicative of the waning interest of members in the budget debate. The budget session is considered by many MPs as a mere formality in which not much role is there for MPs to make any significant contribution. Year after year, MPs demand during the budget debate a greater role for influencing the budget at its preparation stages. It has also been repeatedly suggested that once the budget is presented, the National Assembly should have an increased duration to review it and the demands for grants for ministries should be referred to the respective standing committees for scrutiny before the budget is passed. This key reform in the parliamentary budget process, however, remains elusive. During budget debate 2011, members from across political spectrum forcefully raised that these reforms be instituted in the parliamentary budget process.
He was speaking at the Citizens Forum on Performance of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan: Budget Session 2011-2012, which was organised by PILDAT to analyse the Budget Session Performance of the 13th National Assembly. Abbasi said that quality of the debate was poor “and only few members of the National Assembly understand the Budgetary Process, therefore, budget remains a mystery for most of the members.” “Besides, parliamentary leaders fail to educate their members about the budgetary process,” he added.
Abbasi said that the Finance Minister himself most of the time was absent during the budget debates and he hardly attended any session except budget presentation day.
Other speakers at the Forum included Abdul Rashid Godil, MNA, Wazir Ahmed Jogezai, Former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly; Abdullah Yousaf, Former Chairman Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director of PILDAT.
Presenting an analysis based on PILDAT Citizens’ Report on Performance of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan: Budget Session 2011-2012, Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director PILDAT said that the Federal Budget 2011-2012, tabled in the National Assembly on June 3, 2011 and passed on June 22, 2011 lasted for a dismal 17 actual working days. There was a 16% drop in time consumed in budget debate 2011 compared to 2008; total 35 hours consumed in Budget process in National Assembly compared to 41.6 in 2008. The decade long average of budget sessions from 1998 to 2011 is 12 days while in comparison, in our neighbouring country India, the Parliamentary Budget Process spans over 75 days.
Unlike the practice in other developing as well as mature parliamentary democracies, Standing Committees in Pakistan are not allowed any role to scrutinise departmentally related estimates or demands for grants and therefore no meaningful input is made in the Budget. Mehboob said that while the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab has instituted a Pre-Budget Session every year from January to February, the National Assembly, despite understanding the need to do so in order to allow members to make an input into budget making and priorities, has failed to institute the tradition of a Pre-Budget Session.
Mehboob said that a sharp decline is witnessed in the number of members of the National Assembly participating in the budget debate over the last 4 years of the 13th National Assembly as 39% less MNAs spoke in 2011 compared to 2008. In 2008 budget session, a total of 229 members participated in the budget debate whereas only 139 members participated during the 2011 budget session. The dwindling number of participants may be indicative of the waning interest of members in the budget debate. The budget session is considered by many MPs as a mere formality in which not much role is there for MPs to make any significant contribution. Year after year, MPs demand during the budget debate a greater role for influencing the budget at its preparation stages. It has also been repeatedly suggested that once the budget is presented, the National Assembly should have an increased duration to review it and the demands for grants for ministries should be referred to the respective standing committees for scrutiny before the budget is passed. This key reform in the parliamentary budget process, however, remains elusive. During budget debate 2011, members from across political spectrum forcefully raised that these reforms be instituted in the parliamentary budget process.
Inside Al Qaeda’s hard drives #pakistan #Terrorism
When Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden at his Abbottabad, Pakistan, compound on May 2, the ensuing coverage focused on how the death of Al Qaeda’s leader might undercut terrorism worldwide. But the raid accomplished more than bin Laden’s removal: It yielded several computers, nearly a dozen hard drives, and about 100 other data-storage devices. Speaking on “Meet the Press” the weekend after the raid, presidential national security adviser Tom Donilon called it “the largest cache of intelligence derived from the scene of any single terrorist.”
After combing over this huge pool of data, a task force of analysts has already produced hundreds of intelligence reports geared to a primary goal: hunting down Al Qaeda operatives. Meanwhile, however, there is a second and longer-term task ahead. If studied diligently enough, the captured data is likely to provide an unparalleled look at how Al Qaeda functions. And that information may be as essential to disrupting Al Qaeda’s activities as it was to kill bin Laden.
I speak from experience, because I was part of a team at the RAND Corporation that performed a multiyear analysis of a similar, albeit much smaller, data dump - the data seized from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Over four years, we sought to provide as clear a picture as possible of Al Qaeda in Iraq for military commanders and intelligence officials. We mined information from two sources: declassified documents found on a hard drive at a residence in Julaybah, Iraq, in 2007 by Iraqi Awakening forces, and documents discovered by a patrol of Marines in Tuzliyah, Anbar, Iraq, in that same year. Based on this data, we were able to build a portrait of Al Qaeda in Iraq as a business - and a business that ran quite differently than conventional wisdom would suggest.
Today, analysts searching through data from the bin Laden raid have only just begun a similarly painstaking and time-consuming process. It is this process, beyond simply killing off leaders at the top, that is most likely to lead us to a deep understanding of how groups such as Al Qaeda work. And it is that knowledge, in turn, that will give us the tools to defeat them.
From 2007 to 2010, our team scoured a set of captured financial and organizational documents covering the years 2005 and 2006, and centering on Anbar Province, where Al Qaeda in Iraq was most powerful at that time. What we found there put to rest conflicting theories about Al Qaeda in Iraq’s funding and membership, and revealed it to be a highly systemized, bureaucratic organization. In particular, we learned a remarkable amount about Al Qaeda in Iraq’s franchise status, its flow of money, and its organizational structure.Continued...
When we began our work, we already knew something about the group’s history. Al Qaeda in Iraq was formed in late 2004, after the start of the Iraq War, when the Jordanian terrorist abu Musab al-Zarqawi rebranded his organization under the Al Qaeda banner. His group, Jamaat al-Tawhid al Jihad, had existed since the 1990s, with the initial stated goal of toppling the Jordanian kingdom. But its agenda expanded over time to include discrediting the Iraqi interim government, driving US and coalition forces out of Iraq, and helping to build a broader extremist caliphate.
In other words, the group shared a number of Al Qaeda’s goals, but the name itself was a strategic addition by a lesser-known organization. Al Qaeda in Iraq was not established in a top-down manner by a mastermind flush with millions in capital, the way a company would open an office in a new city. It was more like a local restaurant taking the name of a multinational franchise operation, but with autonomy to adapt the menu to local tastes. The new affiliation coupled Zarqawi’s ruthless vision and ability to rally people to his cause with the Al Qaeda brand name and well-organized franchise structure. After 2004, the group soared in power and popularity.
Yet there was little top-down strategy from Al Qaeda central, and dialogue between the groups was minimal. The documents we examined made it clear that there was no start-up capital from the parent company, just permission to use its name.
And, contrary to speculation that Al Qaeda in Iraq was reliant on international donations, this wasn’t a source of funding either. The group was self-financing. In fact, the core organization of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar province was so profitable that it sent revenue to associates in other provinces of Iraq, and perhaps even further afield. The group raised millions of dollars annually through activities such as simple theft and resale of valuable items such as cars, generators, and electrical cable, and hijacking truckloads of goods, such as clothing. And their internal financial record-keeping was diligent, with all the requirements of expense accounts in regular businesses. A central unit of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s hierarchy required operatives to keep records of even the smallest outlay and to turn over their “take” to upper-level leaders, who made the spending decisions.
These carefully monitored expenses occurred in the context of what was literally a workforce. While people tend to think of Al Qaeda as simply a band of fighters, in reality there was a large organization needed to facilitate attacks and create support within the local community - all of which required money. As such, Al Qaeda in Iraq maintained an expanding payroll of members, imprisoned members, families of members, and dead members’ families, with ever fewer fighters and revenue producers. On the hook to provide for many local Iraqis, it had to resort to increasingly unpopular methods for generating revenue.
Beyond these daily expenditures, Al Qaeda in Iraq had big-ticket expenses. Launching attacks was one recurring overhead cost. An attack involved salaries for operatives, safe houses, transportation, weapons, and a crude form of life insurance for the wounded or for families of those killed. (By contrast, most civilian households in Anbar lacked any form of insurance.) Given these pressures, cash flowed fast in and out of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s central command in Anbar. About every two weeks, Al Qaeda doled out funds to pay not only for attacks, but also for housing, medical, and bureaucratic needs.
In terms of its membership, the group was a religious-political organization; its members were Sunnis, like Saddam Hussein. Many in the group had been disenfranchised after the United States disbanded the Iraqi Army and ended pension payments to retired members of the military, leaving those families without income. Unsurprisingly, then, the group made effective use of a military-like hierarchy. Top-tier Al Qaeda in Iraq commanders in Anbar set strategic goals that local leaders then carried out, making their own tactical decisions. Even as US military and Iraqi forces repeatedly removed Al Qaeda in Iraq leadership, the group’s structure let it replace staff quickly and continue delivery of information and support to members through a system of couriers. A similar courier system was reportedly a key element in the intelligence that led the US military to Osama bin Laden.
In the course of our research, Al Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate emerged as highly self-sufficient. The group appeared to manage its affairs internally; it did not seem to depend on foreign jihadists, though it did accept some as suicide bombers. It was led by strong top-level leaders, who generated media releases, kept prisoners, and issued judicial rulings.
The captured data testified to the fact that the US armed forces had had some success heading off the Iraqi group’s efforts. But the documents also made clear that truly taking the group out of commission was likely to require more than just removing its leaders. When someone in a key role was killed, the procedure for replacing him was nearly automatic.
Even with bin Laden dead and populations in democratic revolt across the Middle East, a US commitment to counterterrorism will need to remain in place - and a deep understanding of these groups’ economic and social structures will be key to combating them.
For example, my team was able to learn that Al Qaeda was forcing local affiliates (or at least its Iraqi one) to sustain themselves financially. If local groups must make their own money, governments and counterterror operatives can use Al Qaeda’s need to raise money - often using illicit means and pressure against local citizens - against the organization. That kind of counterterrorism would look less like war, and more like careful police work against what amounts to a criminal syndicate or mafia.
Two points emerged most importantly from our research on Al Qaeda in Iraq. First, there was no team of international ghost donors padding the group’s coffers. And second, Al Qaeda in Iraq had no strong ties to Al Qaeda central. While there may have been communication that was very well hidden - the eventual declassification of the Osama bin Laden documents may reveal more answers - it was noteworthy that there was virtually no communication to Al Qaeda central in any of the now declassified documents that we saw. Nor have there been any other substantive reports, save the occasional letter, of much communication between the groups, and certainly there seems to be no money flowing one way or the other.
While many Americans celebrate the death of the man who planned the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States needs to remain vigilant, and a large part of the puzzle is to develop a coherent picture of the enemy groups we face. Bin Laden may be dead, but as dedicated citizens pore over the vast store of information he left behind, our quest to understand the organization he built is far from over.
Renny McPherson served as an active duty Marine Corps officer in Anbar Province, Iraq, in 2006 and a civilian adviser in Baghdad in 2008; he recently graduated from Harvard Business School. You can read the full study, which McPherson researched with Howard J. Shatz and Ben Bahney,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html.
After combing over this huge pool of data, a task force of analysts has already produced hundreds of intelligence reports geared to a primary goal: hunting down Al Qaeda operatives. Meanwhile, however, there is a second and longer-term task ahead. If studied diligently enough, the captured data is likely to provide an unparalleled look at how Al Qaeda functions. And that information may be as essential to disrupting Al Qaeda’s activities as it was to kill bin Laden.
I speak from experience, because I was part of a team at the RAND Corporation that performed a multiyear analysis of a similar, albeit much smaller, data dump - the data seized from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Over four years, we sought to provide as clear a picture as possible of Al Qaeda in Iraq for military commanders and intelligence officials. We mined information from two sources: declassified documents found on a hard drive at a residence in Julaybah, Iraq, in 2007 by Iraqi Awakening forces, and documents discovered by a patrol of Marines in Tuzliyah, Anbar, Iraq, in that same year. Based on this data, we were able to build a portrait of Al Qaeda in Iraq as a business - and a business that ran quite differently than conventional wisdom would suggest.
Today, analysts searching through data from the bin Laden raid have only just begun a similarly painstaking and time-consuming process. It is this process, beyond simply killing off leaders at the top, that is most likely to lead us to a deep understanding of how groups such as Al Qaeda work. And it is that knowledge, in turn, that will give us the tools to defeat them.
From 2007 to 2010, our team scoured a set of captured financial and organizational documents covering the years 2005 and 2006, and centering on Anbar Province, where Al Qaeda in Iraq was most powerful at that time. What we found there put to rest conflicting theories about Al Qaeda in Iraq’s funding and membership, and revealed it to be a highly systemized, bureaucratic organization. In particular, we learned a remarkable amount about Al Qaeda in Iraq’s franchise status, its flow of money, and its organizational structure.Continued...
When we began our work, we already knew something about the group’s history. Al Qaeda in Iraq was formed in late 2004, after the start of the Iraq War, when the Jordanian terrorist abu Musab al-Zarqawi rebranded his organization under the Al Qaeda banner. His group, Jamaat al-Tawhid al Jihad, had existed since the 1990s, with the initial stated goal of toppling the Jordanian kingdom. But its agenda expanded over time to include discrediting the Iraqi interim government, driving US and coalition forces out of Iraq, and helping to build a broader extremist caliphate.
In other words, the group shared a number of Al Qaeda’s goals, but the name itself was a strategic addition by a lesser-known organization. Al Qaeda in Iraq was not established in a top-down manner by a mastermind flush with millions in capital, the way a company would open an office in a new city. It was more like a local restaurant taking the name of a multinational franchise operation, but with autonomy to adapt the menu to local tastes. The new affiliation coupled Zarqawi’s ruthless vision and ability to rally people to his cause with the Al Qaeda brand name and well-organized franchise structure. After 2004, the group soared in power and popularity.
Yet there was little top-down strategy from Al Qaeda central, and dialogue between the groups was minimal. The documents we examined made it clear that there was no start-up capital from the parent company, just permission to use its name.
And, contrary to speculation that Al Qaeda in Iraq was reliant on international donations, this wasn’t a source of funding either. The group was self-financing. In fact, the core organization of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar province was so profitable that it sent revenue to associates in other provinces of Iraq, and perhaps even further afield. The group raised millions of dollars annually through activities such as simple theft and resale of valuable items such as cars, generators, and electrical cable, and hijacking truckloads of goods, such as clothing. And their internal financial record-keeping was diligent, with all the requirements of expense accounts in regular businesses. A central unit of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s hierarchy required operatives to keep records of even the smallest outlay and to turn over their “take” to upper-level leaders, who made the spending decisions.
These carefully monitored expenses occurred in the context of what was literally a workforce. While people tend to think of Al Qaeda as simply a band of fighters, in reality there was a large organization needed to facilitate attacks and create support within the local community - all of which required money. As such, Al Qaeda in Iraq maintained an expanding payroll of members, imprisoned members, families of members, and dead members’ families, with ever fewer fighters and revenue producers. On the hook to provide for many local Iraqis, it had to resort to increasingly unpopular methods for generating revenue.
Beyond these daily expenditures, Al Qaeda in Iraq had big-ticket expenses. Launching attacks was one recurring overhead cost. An attack involved salaries for operatives, safe houses, transportation, weapons, and a crude form of life insurance for the wounded or for families of those killed. (By contrast, most civilian households in Anbar lacked any form of insurance.) Given these pressures, cash flowed fast in and out of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s central command in Anbar. About every two weeks, Al Qaeda doled out funds to pay not only for attacks, but also for housing, medical, and bureaucratic needs.
In terms of its membership, the group was a religious-political organization; its members were Sunnis, like Saddam Hussein. Many in the group had been disenfranchised after the United States disbanded the Iraqi Army and ended pension payments to retired members of the military, leaving those families without income. Unsurprisingly, then, the group made effective use of a military-like hierarchy. Top-tier Al Qaeda in Iraq commanders in Anbar set strategic goals that local leaders then carried out, making their own tactical decisions. Even as US military and Iraqi forces repeatedly removed Al Qaeda in Iraq leadership, the group’s structure let it replace staff quickly and continue delivery of information and support to members through a system of couriers. A similar courier system was reportedly a key element in the intelligence that led the US military to Osama bin Laden.
In the course of our research, Al Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate emerged as highly self-sufficient. The group appeared to manage its affairs internally; it did not seem to depend on foreign jihadists, though it did accept some as suicide bombers. It was led by strong top-level leaders, who generated media releases, kept prisoners, and issued judicial rulings.
The captured data testified to the fact that the US armed forces had had some success heading off the Iraqi group’s efforts. But the documents also made clear that truly taking the group out of commission was likely to require more than just removing its leaders. When someone in a key role was killed, the procedure for replacing him was nearly automatic.
Even with bin Laden dead and populations in democratic revolt across the Middle East, a US commitment to counterterrorism will need to remain in place - and a deep understanding of these groups’ economic and social structures will be key to combating them.
For example, my team was able to learn that Al Qaeda was forcing local affiliates (or at least its Iraqi one) to sustain themselves financially. If local groups must make their own money, governments and counterterror operatives can use Al Qaeda’s need to raise money - often using illicit means and pressure against local citizens - against the organization. That kind of counterterrorism would look less like war, and more like careful police work against what amounts to a criminal syndicate or mafia.
Two points emerged most importantly from our research on Al Qaeda in Iraq. First, there was no team of international ghost donors padding the group’s coffers. And second, Al Qaeda in Iraq had no strong ties to Al Qaeda central. While there may have been communication that was very well hidden - the eventual declassification of the Osama bin Laden documents may reveal more answers - it was noteworthy that there was virtually no communication to Al Qaeda central in any of the now declassified documents that we saw. Nor have there been any other substantive reports, save the occasional letter, of much communication between the groups, and certainly there seems to be no money flowing one way or the other.
While many Americans celebrate the death of the man who planned the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States needs to remain vigilant, and a large part of the puzzle is to develop a coherent picture of the enemy groups we face. Bin Laden may be dead, but as dedicated citizens pore over the vast store of information he left behind, our quest to understand the organization he built is far from over.
Renny McPherson served as an active duty Marine Corps officer in Anbar Province, Iraq, in 2006 and a civilian adviser in Baghdad in 2008; he recently graduated from Harvard Business School. You can read the full study, which McPherson researched with Howard J. Shatz and Ben Bahney,
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html.
Osama Bin Laden planning to assasinate US President Barack Obama while living sheltered life in #pakistan
Documents recovered from Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan show that al Qaeda spoke of attacking President Barack Obama and Gen. David Petraeus, a source familiar with the materials recovered from the compound said Friday.
The documents refer to an attack that would destroy the aircraft carrying Obama and Petraeus in the region, the source said.
It was not immediately clear whether the documents referred to an attack that was specifically planned or whether they referred in a more general way to a desire by al Qaeda to attack the president and Petraeus, who was until recently the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan.
U.S. forces killed bin Laden during a raid on May 2. They recovered documents and other material during the raid.
Petraeus declined to comment, a spokesman said Friday.
Other materials taken from Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan have confirmed that the al Qaeda leader communicated with the Yemen-based group al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, according to a U.S. official familiar with the ongoing U.S. analysis of the documents.
The search through bin Laden's materials has also found direct evidence that while in hiding in Pakistan, bin Laden was encouraging direct plots to attack Americans and U.S. interests in Europe late last year, according to the U.S. official.
There were several threats at the time that led the United States to issue an October 2010 alert for Americans traveling in Europe, the source emphasized.
Bin Laden was "aware, supportive and trying to motivate his operatives in Europe. He was pushing them," the source said.
The U.S. intelligence community had classified information at the time suggesting that bin Laden was involved, the U.S. official said, but the documents taken from the compound have provided confirmation. Officials have previously said bin Laden always placed a top priority on trying to attack Americans.
from the compound have provided confirmation. Officials have previously said bin Laden always placed a top priority on trying to attack Americans.
The documents refer to an attack that would destroy the aircraft carrying Obama and Petraeus in the region, the source said.
It was not immediately clear whether the documents referred to an attack that was specifically planned or whether they referred in a more general way to a desire by al Qaeda to attack the president and Petraeus, who was until recently the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan.
U.S. forces killed bin Laden during a raid on May 2. They recovered documents and other material during the raid.
Petraeus declined to comment, a spokesman said Friday.
Other materials taken from Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan have confirmed that the al Qaeda leader communicated with the Yemen-based group al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, according to a U.S. official familiar with the ongoing U.S. analysis of the documents.
The search through bin Laden's materials has also found direct evidence that while in hiding in Pakistan, bin Laden was encouraging direct plots to attack Americans and U.S. interests in Europe late last year, according to the U.S. official.
There were several threats at the time that led the United States to issue an October 2010 alert for Americans traveling in Europe, the source emphasized.
Bin Laden was "aware, supportive and trying to motivate his operatives in Europe. He was pushing them," the source said.
The U.S. intelligence community had classified information at the time suggesting that bin Laden was involved, the U.S. official said, but the documents taken from the compound have provided confirmation. Officials have previously said bin Laden always placed a top priority on trying to attack Americans.
from the compound have provided confirmation. Officials have previously said bin Laden always placed a top priority on trying to attack Americans.
Garment manufacturers relocating plants from #pakistan to #Bangladesh & #China
Author: Ahmed Abdullah | 15 July 2011
The Pakistani government is being urged to take measures to discourage woven garment manufacturers and exporters from relocating their businesses to countries like Bangladesh and China.
The call comes after a number of woven garment plants recently relocated from Karachi to Bangladesh, with many others looking to set up units in China, according to the Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers & Exporters Association (PRGMEA).
Bangladesh offers several advantages to woven garment manufacturers over Pakistan, Ijaz Khokhar, central chairman PRGMEA, told just-style. These include an uninterrupted energy supply at cheaper rates, efficient and skilled workers, low production costs, and duty-free market access to the European Union.
He urged the Ministry of Textiles to take measures and resume the Drawback of Local Taxes and Levies (DLTL) scheme to discourage the relocation and encourage woven garment manufacturers and exporters to continue with their businesses in Pakistan.
The textile industry accounts for over 50% of Pakistan's total export receipts and provides direct employment for around 2.5m people. The industry currently faces high inflation, low labour productivity, energy problems, raw material shortages and very high interest rates.
The Pakistani government is being urged to take measures to discourage woven garment manufacturers and exporters from relocating their businesses to countries like Bangladesh and China.
The call comes after a number of woven garment plants recently relocated from Karachi to Bangladesh, with many others looking to set up units in China, according to the Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers & Exporters Association (PRGMEA).
Bangladesh offers several advantages to woven garment manufacturers over Pakistan, Ijaz Khokhar, central chairman PRGMEA, told just-style. These include an uninterrupted energy supply at cheaper rates, efficient and skilled workers, low production costs, and duty-free market access to the European Union.
He urged the Ministry of Textiles to take measures and resume the Drawback of Local Taxes and Levies (DLTL) scheme to discourage the relocation and encourage woven garment manufacturers and exporters to continue with their businesses in Pakistan.
The textile industry accounts for over 50% of Pakistan's total export receipts and provides direct employment for around 2.5m people. The industry currently faces high inflation, low labour productivity, energy problems, raw material shortages and very high interest rates.
#pakistan Supreme Court grants bail to criminal mastermind behind attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team
key suspect in the 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore has been released from Kot Lakhpat Jail after the
Pakistan Supreme Court
granted him bail.
Malik Ishaq, one of the founders of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, had appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the decision of the Lahore high court (LHC), which had rejected his bail plea earlier.
Ishaq had been accused of plotting the attack while he was in prison.
According to The Express Tribune, Ishaq was granted bail, as the charges against him could not be proved.
He had been in prison since 1997 and had 44 cases ranging from murder to terrorism lodged against him, but the court acquitted him in 34 cases and granted him bail in the rest.
The attack on the Sri Lankan team occurred on March 3, 2009, when a bus carrying the cricketers was fired upon by 12 gunmen, near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore.
The cricketers were on their way to play the third day of the second Test against Pakistan.
Six members of the Sri Lankan team were injured. Six Pakistani policemen and two civilians were killed.
These were the first attacks on a national sports team since the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian militants in 1972.
The attack was carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the outlawed militant groups with close links to al-Qaida.
Pakistan Supreme Court
granted him bail.
Malik Ishaq, one of the founders of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, had appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the decision of the Lahore high court (LHC), which had rejected his bail plea earlier.
Ishaq had been accused of plotting the attack while he was in prison.
According to The Express Tribune, Ishaq was granted bail, as the charges against him could not be proved.
He had been in prison since 1997 and had 44 cases ranging from murder to terrorism lodged against him, but the court acquitted him in 34 cases and granted him bail in the rest.
The attack on the Sri Lankan team occurred on March 3, 2009, when a bus carrying the cricketers was fired upon by 12 gunmen, near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore.
The cricketers were on their way to play the third day of the second Test against Pakistan.
Six members of the Sri Lankan team were injured. Six Pakistani policemen and two civilians were killed.
These were the first attacks on a national sports team since the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian militants in 1972.
The attack was carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the outlawed militant groups with close links to al-Qaida.
Shaheed Salman Taseer: truest patriot of #pakistan - hated the kufr India #fact
By Aatish Taseer, his son
Ten days before he was assassinated in January, my father, Salman Taseer, sent out a tweet about an Indian rocket that had come down over the Bay of Bengal: "Why does India make fools of themselves messing in space technology? Stick 2 bollywood my advice."
My father was the governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, and his tweet, with its taunt at India's misfortune, would have delighted his many thousands of followers. It fed straight into Pakistan's unhealthy obsession with India, the country from which it was carved in 1947.
Though my father's attitude went down well in Pakistan, it had caused considerable tension between us. I am half-Indian, raised in Delhi by my Indian mother: India is a country that I consider my own. When my father was killed by one of his own bodyguards for defending a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, we had not spoken for three years.
To understand the Pakistani obsession with India, to get a sense of its special edge—its hysteria—it is necessary to understand the rejection of India, its culture and past, that lies at the heart of the idea of Pakistan. This is not merely an academic question. Pakistan's animus toward India is the cause of both its unwillingness to fight Islamic extremism and its active complicity in undermining the aims of its ostensible ally, the United States.
The idea of Pakistan was first seriously formulated by neither a cleric nor a politician but by a poet. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal, addressing the All-India Muslim league, made the case for a state in which India's Muslims would realize their "political and ethical essence." Though he was always vague about what the new state would be, he was quite clear about what it would not be: the old pluralistic society of India, with its composite culture.
Iqbal's vision took concrete shape in August 1947. Despite the partition of British India, it had seemed at first that there would be no transfer of populations. But violence erupted, and it quickly became clear that in the new homeland for India's Muslims, there would be no place for its non-Muslim communities. Pakistan and India came into being at the cost of a million lives and the largest migration in history.
This shared experience of carnage and loss is the foundation of the modern relationship between the two countries. In human terms, it meant that each of my parents, my father in Pakistan and my mother in India, grew up around symmetrically violent stories of uprooting and homelessness.
But in Pakistan, the partition had another, deeper meaning. It raised big questions, in cultural and civilizational terms, about what its separation from India would mean.
In the absence of a true national identity, Pakistan defined itself by its opposition to India. It turned its back on all that had been common between Muslims and non-Muslims in the era before partition. Everything came under suspicion, from dress to customs to festivals, marriage rituals and literature. The new country set itself the task of erasing its association with the subcontinent, an association that many came to view as a contamination.
Had this assertion of national identity meant the casting out of something alien or foreign in favor of an organic or homegrown identity, it might have had an empowering effect. What made it self-wounding, even nihilistic, was that Pakistan, by asserting a new Arabized Islamic identity, rejected its own local and regional culture. In trying to turn its back on its shared past with India, Pakistan turned its back on itself.
But there was one problem: India was just across the border, and it was still its composite, pluralistic self, a place where nearly as many Muslims lived as in Pakistan. It was a daily reminder of the past that Pakistan had tried to erase.
Pakistan's existential confusion made itself apparent in the political turmoil of the decades after partition. The state failed to perform a single legal transfer of power; coups were commonplace. And yet, in 1980, my father would still have felt that the partition had not been a mistake, for one critical reason: India, for all its democracy and pluralism, was an economic disaster.
Pakistan had better roads, better cars; Pakistani businesses were thriving; its citizens could take foreign currency abroad. Compared with starving, socialist India, they were on much surer ground. So what if India had democracy? It had brought nothing but drought and famine.
But in the early 1990s, a reversal began to occur in the fortunes of the two countries. The advantage that Pakistan had seemed to enjoy in the years after independence evaporated, as it became clear that the quest to rid itself of its Indian identity had come at a price: the emergence of a new and dangerous brand of Islam.
As India rose, thanks to economic liberalization, Pakistan withered. The country that had begun as a poet's utopia was reduced to ruin and insolvency.
The primary agent of this decline has been the Pakistani army. The beneficiary of vast amounts of American assistance and money—$11 billion since 9/11—the military has diverted a significant amount of these resources to arming itself against India. In Afghanistan, it has sought neither security nor stability but rather a backyard, which—once the Americans leave—might provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" against India.
In order to realize these objectives, the Pakistani army has led the U.S. in a dance, in which it had to be seen to be fighting the war on terror, but never so much as to actually win it, for its extension meant the continuing flow of American money. All this time the army kept alive a double game, in which some terror was fought and some—such as Laskhar-e-Tayyba's 2008 attack on Mumbai—actively supported.
The army's duplicity was exposed decisively this May, with the killing of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad. It was only the last and most incriminating charge against an institution whose activities over the years have included the creation of the Taliban, the financing of international terrorism and the running of a lucrative trade in nuclear secrets.
This army, whose might has always been justified by the imaginary threat from India, has been more harmful to Pakistan than to anybody else. It has consumed annually a quarter of the country's wealth, undermined one civilian government after another and enriched itself through a range of economic interests, from bakeries and shopping malls to huge property holdings.
The reversal in the fortunes of the two countries—India's sudden prosperity and cultural power, seen next to the calamity of Muhammad Iqbal's unrealized utopia—is what explains the bitterness of my father's tweet just days before he died. It captures the rage of being forced to reject a culture of which you feel effortlessly a part—a culture that Pakistanis, via Bollywood, experience daily in their homes.
This rage is what makes it impossible to reduce Pakistan's obsession with India to matters of security or a land dispute in Kashmir. It can heal only when the wounds of 1947 are healed. And it should provoke no triumphalism in India, for behind the bluster and the bravado, there is arid pain and sadness.
—Mr. Taseer is the author of "Stranger to History: A Son's Journey Through Islamic Lands." His second novel, "Noon," will be published in the U.S. in September.
Ten days before he was assassinated in January, my father, Salman Taseer, sent out a tweet about an Indian rocket that had come down over the Bay of Bengal: "Why does India make fools of themselves messing in space technology? Stick 2 bollywood my advice."
My father was the governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, and his tweet, with its taunt at India's misfortune, would have delighted his many thousands of followers. It fed straight into Pakistan's unhealthy obsession with India, the country from which it was carved in 1947.
Though my father's attitude went down well in Pakistan, it had caused considerable tension between us. I am half-Indian, raised in Delhi by my Indian mother: India is a country that I consider my own. When my father was killed by one of his own bodyguards for defending a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, we had not spoken for three years.
To understand the Pakistani obsession with India, to get a sense of its special edge—its hysteria—it is necessary to understand the rejection of India, its culture and past, that lies at the heart of the idea of Pakistan. This is not merely an academic question. Pakistan's animus toward India is the cause of both its unwillingness to fight Islamic extremism and its active complicity in undermining the aims of its ostensible ally, the United States.
The idea of Pakistan was first seriously formulated by neither a cleric nor a politician but by a poet. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal, addressing the All-India Muslim league, made the case for a state in which India's Muslims would realize their "political and ethical essence." Though he was always vague about what the new state would be, he was quite clear about what it would not be: the old pluralistic society of India, with its composite culture.
Iqbal's vision took concrete shape in August 1947. Despite the partition of British India, it had seemed at first that there would be no transfer of populations. But violence erupted, and it quickly became clear that in the new homeland for India's Muslims, there would be no place for its non-Muslim communities. Pakistan and India came into being at the cost of a million lives and the largest migration in history.
This shared experience of carnage and loss is the foundation of the modern relationship between the two countries. In human terms, it meant that each of my parents, my father in Pakistan and my mother in India, grew up around symmetrically violent stories of uprooting and homelessness.
But in Pakistan, the partition had another, deeper meaning. It raised big questions, in cultural and civilizational terms, about what its separation from India would mean.
In the absence of a true national identity, Pakistan defined itself by its opposition to India. It turned its back on all that had been common between Muslims and non-Muslims in the era before partition. Everything came under suspicion, from dress to customs to festivals, marriage rituals and literature. The new country set itself the task of erasing its association with the subcontinent, an association that many came to view as a contamination.
Had this assertion of national identity meant the casting out of something alien or foreign in favor of an organic or homegrown identity, it might have had an empowering effect. What made it self-wounding, even nihilistic, was that Pakistan, by asserting a new Arabized Islamic identity, rejected its own local and regional culture. In trying to turn its back on its shared past with India, Pakistan turned its back on itself.
But there was one problem: India was just across the border, and it was still its composite, pluralistic self, a place where nearly as many Muslims lived as in Pakistan. It was a daily reminder of the past that Pakistan had tried to erase.
Pakistan's existential confusion made itself apparent in the political turmoil of the decades after partition. The state failed to perform a single legal transfer of power; coups were commonplace. And yet, in 1980, my father would still have felt that the partition had not been a mistake, for one critical reason: India, for all its democracy and pluralism, was an economic disaster.
Pakistan had better roads, better cars; Pakistani businesses were thriving; its citizens could take foreign currency abroad. Compared with starving, socialist India, they were on much surer ground. So what if India had democracy? It had brought nothing but drought and famine.
But in the early 1990s, a reversal began to occur in the fortunes of the two countries. The advantage that Pakistan had seemed to enjoy in the years after independence evaporated, as it became clear that the quest to rid itself of its Indian identity had come at a price: the emergence of a new and dangerous brand of Islam.
As India rose, thanks to economic liberalization, Pakistan withered. The country that had begun as a poet's utopia was reduced to ruin and insolvency.
The primary agent of this decline has been the Pakistani army. The beneficiary of vast amounts of American assistance and money—$11 billion since 9/11—the military has diverted a significant amount of these resources to arming itself against India. In Afghanistan, it has sought neither security nor stability but rather a backyard, which—once the Americans leave—might provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" against India.
In order to realize these objectives, the Pakistani army has led the U.S. in a dance, in which it had to be seen to be fighting the war on terror, but never so much as to actually win it, for its extension meant the continuing flow of American money. All this time the army kept alive a double game, in which some terror was fought and some—such as Laskhar-e-Tayyba's 2008 attack on Mumbai—actively supported.
The army's duplicity was exposed decisively this May, with the killing of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad. It was only the last and most incriminating charge against an institution whose activities over the years have included the creation of the Taliban, the financing of international terrorism and the running of a lucrative trade in nuclear secrets.
This army, whose might has always been justified by the imaginary threat from India, has been more harmful to Pakistan than to anybody else. It has consumed annually a quarter of the country's wealth, undermined one civilian government after another and enriched itself through a range of economic interests, from bakeries and shopping malls to huge property holdings.
The reversal in the fortunes of the two countries—India's sudden prosperity and cultural power, seen next to the calamity of Muhammad Iqbal's unrealized utopia—is what explains the bitterness of my father's tweet just days before he died. It captures the rage of being forced to reject a culture of which you feel effortlessly a part—a culture that Pakistanis, via Bollywood, experience daily in their homes.
This rage is what makes it impossible to reduce Pakistan's obsession with India to matters of security or a land dispute in Kashmir. It can heal only when the wounds of 1947 are healed. And it should provoke no triumphalism in India, for behind the bluster and the bravado, there is arid pain and sadness.
—Mr. Taseer is the author of "Stranger to History: A Son's Journey Through Islamic Lands." His second novel, "Noon," will be published in the U.S. in September.
Friday, July 15, 2011
#pakistan's Middle Class Extremists: Why Development Aid Won't reduce its Radicalism
Graeme Blair, C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, Jacob N. Shapiro
GRAEME BLAIR is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. NEIL MALHOTRA is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. JACOB N. SHAPIRO is an assistant professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University.
Since al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and then attacked the World Trade Center three years later, the United States has dedicated billions of dollars and thousands of lives to addressing the threat of terrorism. Over time, policymakers converged on economic development as a key to ending terrorism, in the belief that poorer people are more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups or more likely to perpetrate violence themselves. If economic development aid raised incomes, the thinking went, support for militant groups would diminish.
This logic has taken hold at the highest levels of American policymaking. In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama argued in favor of sending more development aid to poor countries, because “extremely poor societies” are “optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism, and conflict.” The same year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton concurred, declaring economic development an “integral part of America’s national security policy.”
Yet there is no evidence that economic development changes attitudes toward violent militant groups, or even that it is the poor whose attitudes are problematic. A number of scholars, including Claude Berrebi , Alberto Abadie , and Alan Kreuger and Jitka Malečková , have found that people who join terrorist groups are predominantly from middle-class or wealthy families. Public opinion scholarship, such as that of Najeeb M. Shafiq and Abdulkader Sinno , and Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins , suggests that differences in income and education do not explain variation in support for suicide bombing and other forms of violence. According to Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas , job loss appears to correlate with greater violence in Colombia. And Effi Benmelech, Berrebi, and Esteban Klor have found that poor economic conditions enable Palestinian groups to recruit higher-quality operatives. But in another study, Eli Berman explained that regions with higher unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines are actually less violent. In Iraq, moreover, there is no evidence that large-scale development programs impact violence, although small-scale programs administered with deep knowledge of the local context do. Even then, the mechanisms that link small-scale aid programs to diminished violence remain unknown.
Closing this gap in understanding about the relationship between poverty and terrorism could not be more pressing. The United States and its allies have already directed billions of dollars in development aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the last ten years, with no demonstrable impact on the spread of Islamic militancy. With scarce resources to spend, they should be more careful about how they invest them.
The stakes are particularly high in Pakistan. The country provides haven for Islamist terrorists that operate in India and Afghanistan and is itself the victim of a militant insurgency that has killed or injured some 35,000 Pakistanis since 2004. Currently, programs meant to address the problem of homegrown Pakistani militancy by alleviating poverty dominate the Western aid agenda. The 2009 U.S. Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, for example, proposed spending $7.5 billion on economic development in Pakistan, with the express aim of “combating militant extremism.” To test the assumption that poor people are more likely to become radicalized, we fielded a 6,000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis in the four provinces of Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province) in the spring of 2009.
The survey measured attitudes toward four important militant groups: al Qaeda; the Afghan Taliban; the so-called Kashmiri groups, which include Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, among others; and sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. The survey was much larger than any previous effort and, for the first time, included rural Pakistan. Previous studies had been undermined by low response rates, perhaps because they asked Pakistanis directly about their support for militant groups. Instead, we measured attitudes toward the groups using an indirect questioning technique called an “endorsement” experiment. We presented respondents with a set of four policy issues, including World Health Organization’s administration of polio vaccinations and the redefinition of the Durand Line separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, and asked how much they supported each. Some respondents were told that one of the four militant groups supported the policy. Comparing the support for each policy of those who were told a militant group supported the policy with those who were not gives the measure of support for the group.
The data revealed four findings that undermine common wisdom about support for militancy in Pakistan. First, survey participants were generally negatively inclined toward all four militant organizations. Contrary to some popular accounts, Pakistanis do not have a taste for militants. Moreover, they appear to differentiate between groups in subtle ways. Pakistanis were far more likely to believe that the Kashmiri groups provide public goods -- schools, health clinics, and the like -- than they were to associate other organizations with such positive activities . They were also much more likely to say that the Kashmiri groups are fighting for good things, such as justice and democracy than they were about the others.
Second, Pakistanis living in violent parts of the country, in Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa in particular, strongly disliked these groups. This is likely because they pay a disproportionately high price for militant violence, regardless of their views about the groups’ goals. Those from comparatively peaceful areas do not bear the full costs of militant action.
Third, poor Pakistanis nationwide disliked the militant groups about two times more than middle class Pakistanis, who were mildly positive toward the groups. We suspect that this is because much of Pakistan’s militant violence is concentrated in poorer areas and in the bazaars and mosques where less affluent people sell goods, shop, and pray. In addition to being in more physical danger than the rich, the poor are at more of an economic risk from attacks, and income losses are more consequential for them. Wealthier people often have servants run errands to bazaars, and when they do personal shopping they are likelier to do so in upscale stores in their own neighborhoods, which are safer.
Finally, this dislike is strongest among poor urban residents. The negative relationship between poverty and support for militancy is three times stronger in urban Pakistan than in the country as a whole. This finding reinforces the idea that the dislike of the groups is driven by greater exposure to their attacks, which are concentrated in urban areas.
Overall, the findings suggest that arguments tying support for militancy to individuals’ socioeconomic status -- and the policy recommendations that often flow from this assumption -- require substantial revision.
Most governments, including that of the United States, are still reeling from the global recession and looking to make budget cuts where possible. Development assistance aimed at alleviating poverty should not be stopped; countries such as Pakistan have legitimate development needs pertaining to education, health care, and economic growth to support its massive youth bulge. But expecting those programs to reduce militancy is misguided. There are many good reasons to offer development assistance, but counter-radicalization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism are not among them.
GRAEME BLAIR is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. NEIL MALHOTRA is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. JACOB N. SHAPIRO is an assistant professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University.
Since al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and then attacked the World Trade Center three years later, the United States has dedicated billions of dollars and thousands of lives to addressing the threat of terrorism. Over time, policymakers converged on economic development as a key to ending terrorism, in the belief that poorer people are more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups or more likely to perpetrate violence themselves. If economic development aid raised incomes, the thinking went, support for militant groups would diminish.
This logic has taken hold at the highest levels of American policymaking. In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama argued in favor of sending more development aid to poor countries, because “extremely poor societies” are “optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism, and conflict.” The same year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton concurred, declaring economic development an “integral part of America’s national security policy.”
Yet there is no evidence that economic development changes attitudes toward violent militant groups, or even that it is the poor whose attitudes are problematic. A number of scholars, including Claude Berrebi , Alberto Abadie , and Alan Kreuger and Jitka Malečková , have found that people who join terrorist groups are predominantly from middle-class or wealthy families. Public opinion scholarship, such as that of Najeeb M. Shafiq and Abdulkader Sinno , and Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins , suggests that differences in income and education do not explain variation in support for suicide bombing and other forms of violence. According to Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas , job loss appears to correlate with greater violence in Colombia. And Effi Benmelech, Berrebi, and Esteban Klor have found that poor economic conditions enable Palestinian groups to recruit higher-quality operatives. But in another study, Eli Berman explained that regions with higher unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines are actually less violent. In Iraq, moreover, there is no evidence that large-scale development programs impact violence, although small-scale programs administered with deep knowledge of the local context do. Even then, the mechanisms that link small-scale aid programs to diminished violence remain unknown.
Closing this gap in understanding about the relationship between poverty and terrorism could not be more pressing. The United States and its allies have already directed billions of dollars in development aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the last ten years, with no demonstrable impact on the spread of Islamic militancy. With scarce resources to spend, they should be more careful about how they invest them.
The stakes are particularly high in Pakistan. The country provides haven for Islamist terrorists that operate in India and Afghanistan and is itself the victim of a militant insurgency that has killed or injured some 35,000 Pakistanis since 2004. Currently, programs meant to address the problem of homegrown Pakistani militancy by alleviating poverty dominate the Western aid agenda. The 2009 U.S. Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, for example, proposed spending $7.5 billion on economic development in Pakistan, with the express aim of “combating militant extremism.” To test the assumption that poor people are more likely to become radicalized, we fielded a 6,000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis in the four provinces of Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province) in the spring of 2009.
The survey measured attitudes toward four important militant groups: al Qaeda; the Afghan Taliban; the so-called Kashmiri groups, which include Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, among others; and sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. The survey was much larger than any previous effort and, for the first time, included rural Pakistan. Previous studies had been undermined by low response rates, perhaps because they asked Pakistanis directly about their support for militant groups. Instead, we measured attitudes toward the groups using an indirect questioning technique called an “endorsement” experiment. We presented respondents with a set of four policy issues, including World Health Organization’s administration of polio vaccinations and the redefinition of the Durand Line separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, and asked how much they supported each. Some respondents were told that one of the four militant groups supported the policy. Comparing the support for each policy of those who were told a militant group supported the policy with those who were not gives the measure of support for the group.
The data revealed four findings that undermine common wisdom about support for militancy in Pakistan. First, survey participants were generally negatively inclined toward all four militant organizations. Contrary to some popular accounts, Pakistanis do not have a taste for militants. Moreover, they appear to differentiate between groups in subtle ways. Pakistanis were far more likely to believe that the Kashmiri groups provide public goods -- schools, health clinics, and the like -- than they were to associate other organizations with such positive activities . They were also much more likely to say that the Kashmiri groups are fighting for good things, such as justice and democracy than they were about the others.
Second, Pakistanis living in violent parts of the country, in Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa in particular, strongly disliked these groups. This is likely because they pay a disproportionately high price for militant violence, regardless of their views about the groups’ goals. Those from comparatively peaceful areas do not bear the full costs of militant action.
Third, poor Pakistanis nationwide disliked the militant groups about two times more than middle class Pakistanis, who were mildly positive toward the groups. We suspect that this is because much of Pakistan’s militant violence is concentrated in poorer areas and in the bazaars and mosques where less affluent people sell goods, shop, and pray. In addition to being in more physical danger than the rich, the poor are at more of an economic risk from attacks, and income losses are more consequential for them. Wealthier people often have servants run errands to bazaars, and when they do personal shopping they are likelier to do so in upscale stores in their own neighborhoods, which are safer.
Finally, this dislike is strongest among poor urban residents. The negative relationship between poverty and support for militancy is three times stronger in urban Pakistan than in the country as a whole. This finding reinforces the idea that the dislike of the groups is driven by greater exposure to their attacks, which are concentrated in urban areas.
Overall, the findings suggest that arguments tying support for militancy to individuals’ socioeconomic status -- and the policy recommendations that often flow from this assumption -- require substantial revision.
Most governments, including that of the United States, are still reeling from the global recession and looking to make budget cuts where possible. Development assistance aimed at alleviating poverty should not be stopped; countries such as Pakistan have legitimate development needs pertaining to education, health care, and economic growth to support its massive youth bulge. But expecting those programs to reduce militancy is misguided. There are many good reasons to offer development assistance, but counter-radicalization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism are not among them.
"bloody birth of #Bangladesh was brought about because Kissinger encouraged the #Pakistan military to butcher people of E pakistan"
"the bloody birth of Bangladesh was brought about because Kissinger, reaching out to China, simultaneously encouraged the Pakistan military to butcher the people of East Pakistan, as it then was"
U.S. to withhold millions in aid to #pakistan due to non-compliance & supporting terrorism, says Obama's chief of staff #terrorism
The United States is holding back $800 million in aid to Pakistan, President Barack Obama's chief of staff said Sunday.
Appearing on ABC's "This Week," White House Chief of Staff William Daley confirmed a report in the New York Times that the aid was being withheld.
While Pakistan has "been an important ally in the fight on terrorism," Daley said, "now they've taken some steps that have given us reason to pause on some of the aid which we're giving to the military, and we're trying to work through that."
A spokesman for the Pakistani military told CNN the military was not informed of any such plan.
"Since we haven't received anything in writing," Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said, "we will not comment on this matter."
Senior U.S. officials, who declined to speak on the record because of the sensitivity of the situation, said the curtailing of aid, which represents a third of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, was done both to pressure Pakistan to crack down on militants and as retribution for expelling U.S. military trainers.
The funding includes $300 million to compensate Pakistan for the cost of deploying more than 100,000 troops to its border with Afghanistan to combat extremists. Hundreds of millions in training assistance and military hardware is also on the chopping block.
Additionally, officials said that still other portions of the aid cannot be sent because Pakistan has denied visas to American personnel required to operate the equipment that includes helicopter spare parts, radios and night vision goggles.
"In many cases the personnel and the equipment comes as a package," one senior official said.
The aid also includes rifles, ammunition and body armor that Army Special Forces trainers took home with them after Pakistan threw them out of the country after shutting down an American program to train Pakistani troops combating the Taliban and al Qaeda in the country's tribal and border areas.
"While the Pakistani military leadership tells us this is a temporary step, the presence of our trainers is having the immediate consequence of preventing us from delivering a significant amount of military assistance," a senior State Department official said.
"We remain committed to helping Pakistan build its capabilities, but we have communicated to Pakistani officials on numerous occasions that we require certain support in order to provide certain assistance. Working together, allowing an appropriate presence for U.S. military personnel, providing necessary visas, and affording appropriate access are among the things that would allow us to effectively provide assistance," the official added.
The move comes amid intense pressure among lawmakers to halt U.S. security assistance. Last week the House approved a Pentagon budget bill than limits funding for Pakistan's military until the secretaries of defense and state submit a report to Congress explaining how the money will be spent to combat militants.
"When it comes to our military aid," Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told a Senate panel last month, "we are not prepared to continue providing that at the pace we were providing it unless and until we see certain steps taken."
Tensions between the United States and Pakistan, further aggravated by the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbotabad, continue to mount. Last week Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen stepped up U.S. rhetoric against Pakistan, becoming the first American official to publicly accuse Pakistan of sanctioning the murder of journalist, Saleem Shahzad, who was critical of the regime.
The Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency denied any involvement in Shahzad's killing, and Pakistani Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan called Mullen's statement irresponsible.
The senior State Department official said that while the United States wants a "constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan," Washington is urging Islamabad to strengthen its cooperation toward the two countries' "shared security goals."
"We are taking a very clear-eyed approach to our relationship with Pakistan -- weighing both the importance of a continued long-term relationship and the importance of near-term action on key issues," the official said.
On the ABC program Sunday, Daley said the U.S. relationship with Pakistan "is very complicated."
"Obviously there's still a lot of pain that the political system in Pakistan is feeling by virtue of the raid that we did to get Osama bin Laden," although the United States has "no regrets," he said. The relationship with Pakistan "is difficult, but it must be made to work over time," he said.
"But until we get through these difficulties, we'll hold back some of the money that the American taxpayers have committed to give."
Responding to whether that figure was "some $800 million," Daley said, "Yep."
Abbas, the Pakistani military spokesman, told CNN, "We have said in the past that military aid should be redirected to the civilian area where it's needed more."
"As far as the impact is concerned," he added, "we have stated in the past we have conducted operations against militants in the tribal region -- and they have been successful operations -- using our own resources without taking any external support. Those operations in the tribal areas will continue."
Appearing on ABC's "This Week," White House Chief of Staff William Daley confirmed a report in the New York Times that the aid was being withheld.
While Pakistan has "been an important ally in the fight on terrorism," Daley said, "now they've taken some steps that have given us reason to pause on some of the aid which we're giving to the military, and we're trying to work through that."
A spokesman for the Pakistani military told CNN the military was not informed of any such plan.
"Since we haven't received anything in writing," Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas said, "we will not comment on this matter."
Senior U.S. officials, who declined to speak on the record because of the sensitivity of the situation, said the curtailing of aid, which represents a third of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, was done both to pressure Pakistan to crack down on militants and as retribution for expelling U.S. military trainers.
The funding includes $300 million to compensate Pakistan for the cost of deploying more than 100,000 troops to its border with Afghanistan to combat extremists. Hundreds of millions in training assistance and military hardware is also on the chopping block.
Additionally, officials said that still other portions of the aid cannot be sent because Pakistan has denied visas to American personnel required to operate the equipment that includes helicopter spare parts, radios and night vision goggles.
"In many cases the personnel and the equipment comes as a package," one senior official said.
The aid also includes rifles, ammunition and body armor that Army Special Forces trainers took home with them after Pakistan threw them out of the country after shutting down an American program to train Pakistani troops combating the Taliban and al Qaeda in the country's tribal and border areas.
"While the Pakistani military leadership tells us this is a temporary step, the presence of our trainers is having the immediate consequence of preventing us from delivering a significant amount of military assistance," a senior State Department official said.
"We remain committed to helping Pakistan build its capabilities, but we have communicated to Pakistani officials on numerous occasions that we require certain support in order to provide certain assistance. Working together, allowing an appropriate presence for U.S. military personnel, providing necessary visas, and affording appropriate access are among the things that would allow us to effectively provide assistance," the official added.
The move comes amid intense pressure among lawmakers to halt U.S. security assistance. Last week the House approved a Pentagon budget bill than limits funding for Pakistan's military until the secretaries of defense and state submit a report to Congress explaining how the money will be spent to combat militants.
"When it comes to our military aid," Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told a Senate panel last month, "we are not prepared to continue providing that at the pace we were providing it unless and until we see certain steps taken."
Tensions between the United States and Pakistan, further aggravated by the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbotabad, continue to mount. Last week Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen stepped up U.S. rhetoric against Pakistan, becoming the first American official to publicly accuse Pakistan of sanctioning the murder of journalist, Saleem Shahzad, who was critical of the regime.
The Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency denied any involvement in Shahzad's killing, and Pakistani Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan called Mullen's statement irresponsible.
The senior State Department official said that while the United States wants a "constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan," Washington is urging Islamabad to strengthen its cooperation toward the two countries' "shared security goals."
"We are taking a very clear-eyed approach to our relationship with Pakistan -- weighing both the importance of a continued long-term relationship and the importance of near-term action on key issues," the official said.
On the ABC program Sunday, Daley said the U.S. relationship with Pakistan "is very complicated."
"Obviously there's still a lot of pain that the political system in Pakistan is feeling by virtue of the raid that we did to get Osama bin Laden," although the United States has "no regrets," he said. The relationship with Pakistan "is difficult, but it must be made to work over time," he said.
"But until we get through these difficulties, we'll hold back some of the money that the American taxpayers have committed to give."
Responding to whether that figure was "some $800 million," Daley said, "Yep."
Abbas, the Pakistani military spokesman, told CNN, "We have said in the past that military aid should be redirected to the civilian area where it's needed more."
"As far as the impact is concerned," he added, "we have stated in the past we have conducted operations against militants in the tribal region -- and they have been successful operations -- using our own resources without taking any external support. Those operations in the tribal areas will continue."
No, #pakistan Is Not Off the Hook #terrorism
When three bombs tore through Mumbai on the rain-drenched summer's evening of July 13, more than a few people in windowless Washington, D.C., offices probably stopped eating their breakfasts, their hearts beating a little faster. If the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) had hit the city once more, the beleaguered government in Delhi, sensing post-Abbottabad opportunities, might have felt compelled to strike out across the border.
As nameless Indian and American officials began hinting in anonymous press leaks that the "domestic" Indian Mujahideen (IM) was the more probable perpetrator, sighs of relief might have followed. Yes, this would be one more in the string of attacks that have killed 700 Mumbaikars since 1993, but its fallout would be wholly contained within India.
This complacency is unwarranted, however. It is true that the IM's distance from the Pakistani military establishment means that there will be no standoff like that of 2001-02, when India mobilized half a million men to the border. The IM's all-Indian membership and leadership, and its presence across the country, would seem to suggest that it's a purely domestic problem.
But it is no less important to understand that the group has flourished by plugging itself into transnational jihadi networks, enjoying the patronage of Pakistan-backed groups like LeT, which in turn remain the most serious threats to regional stability. Pakistan doesn't get off the hook so easily.
Who are the Indian Mujahideen?
The IM is an offshoot of an offshoot. In 1977, the Student's Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) emerged as a student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), a radical but non-violent Islamist movement headquartered in Delhi.
SIMI became progressively more radicalized through the 1980s, spurred on by Hindu extremists' destruction of a mosque (the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya) and consequent riots across Mumbai in 1992. An armed wing coalesced toward the end of that decade, with recruiting spreading from the group's northern heartland to southern India.
Around 2001, when SIMI was banned by the Indian government, IM formed as a splinter or successor organization (it remains unclear which). Its first claimed attack was a trio of bombings in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, described by the group as "Islamic raids." Other attacks followed in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmadabad, and New Delhi.
In 2002, horrific anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat, in which the state's Hindu nationalist government was widely understood to be at least passively complicit, was a massive boon to the group's recruitment efforts. IM described its bombings in 2008, somewhat cynically, as the "revenge of Gujarat," even as it sporadically harnessed the language of Osama bin Laden's global jihad.
Homegrown...
IM sits at the intersection of two interwoven strands. The first is India's own difficulties with integrating Muslims into a state whose noble secular promise has frequently been found wanting, in areas ranging from housing allocation to political participation to access to education.
In an unpublished paper, Praveen Swami, an authority on Indian jihadi groups, argues that Indian jihadists owe their rise to Muslim underrepresentation and marginalization. Though they "endorse the al Qaeda message," Georgetown University scholar C. Christine Fair writes, summarizing the article, "they appear to motivate cadres and leaders by focusing on the plight of India's Muslims rather than those of the larger Muslim world."
B. Raman, the former head of counterterrorism for India's foreign intelligence service, notes repeatedly in his memoirs that the 1992 mosque destruction "marked an important watershed in the attitude of sections of the Muslim youth" who were rendered into "fertile soil" for jihadi ideology. Before that point, there had been no jihadi terrorism on Indian soil outside of Kashmir.
This is not an argument for making excuses for terrorism, or a call for India to appease its neofundamentalists. Nor is this about money, as Swami notes elsewhere, as it can only be a short-term fix to deep problems of alienation and humiliation. Plainly put, India needs to do a better job in treating its 138 million Muslims equally under the law, thereby denying jihadi claims the ideological traction they seek.
...But foreign-fed
A closer look at IM's makeup, however, undercuts the facile notion that better communal relations would cause its hardcore adherents to disintegrate, or that we can make easy distinctions between "homegrown" and "foreign" militancy.
The IM was more than just an armed Indian student group. Its birth was midwifed by the LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami Bangladesh, as well as organized crime networks linked to Pakistan. The 2006 bombings of Mumbai trains that killed 209 were, according to Georgetown's Fair, "an LeT operation outsourced through SIMI," the earlier incarnation of IM. In an authoritative study of the groups, she notes that the LeT "serves as a provider of logistical and ideological infrastructure to the regional jihadist movement."
In South Asia's complex terrorist stew, it's often hard to distinguish one organization from another. For instance, in 2002, around 14 IM recruits from Hyderabad were trained in the Pakistani camps of LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, a related group. It strains credulity to suppose that this was not done with the approval of the Pakistani spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. When an IM bomb factory was raided in October 2009, the bombmaker fled to a LeT safe house in Karachi. He returned to bomb a bakery in Pune in February 2010.
In other words, "homegrown" doesn't necessarily mean "domestic." LeT and its backers in the Pakistani state have every incentive to give their covert war against India an indigenous face. The Indian Mujahideen may have been born of India's communalism, but it was weaned on the unrelenting militancy of a certain country to the north.
As nameless Indian and American officials began hinting in anonymous press leaks that the "domestic" Indian Mujahideen (IM) was the more probable perpetrator, sighs of relief might have followed. Yes, this would be one more in the string of attacks that have killed 700 Mumbaikars since 1993, but its fallout would be wholly contained within India.
This complacency is unwarranted, however. It is true that the IM's distance from the Pakistani military establishment means that there will be no standoff like that of 2001-02, when India mobilized half a million men to the border. The IM's all-Indian membership and leadership, and its presence across the country, would seem to suggest that it's a purely domestic problem.
But it is no less important to understand that the group has flourished by plugging itself into transnational jihadi networks, enjoying the patronage of Pakistan-backed groups like LeT, which in turn remain the most serious threats to regional stability. Pakistan doesn't get off the hook so easily.
Who are the Indian Mujahideen?
The IM is an offshoot of an offshoot. In 1977, the Student's Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) emerged as a student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), a radical but non-violent Islamist movement headquartered in Delhi.
SIMI became progressively more radicalized through the 1980s, spurred on by Hindu extremists' destruction of a mosque (the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya) and consequent riots across Mumbai in 1992. An armed wing coalesced toward the end of that decade, with recruiting spreading from the group's northern heartland to southern India.
Around 2001, when SIMI was banned by the Indian government, IM formed as a splinter or successor organization (it remains unclear which). Its first claimed attack was a trio of bombings in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, described by the group as "Islamic raids." Other attacks followed in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmadabad, and New Delhi.
In 2002, horrific anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat, in which the state's Hindu nationalist government was widely understood to be at least passively complicit, was a massive boon to the group's recruitment efforts. IM described its bombings in 2008, somewhat cynically, as the "revenge of Gujarat," even as it sporadically harnessed the language of Osama bin Laden's global jihad.
Homegrown...
IM sits at the intersection of two interwoven strands. The first is India's own difficulties with integrating Muslims into a state whose noble secular promise has frequently been found wanting, in areas ranging from housing allocation to political participation to access to education.
In an unpublished paper, Praveen Swami, an authority on Indian jihadi groups, argues that Indian jihadists owe their rise to Muslim underrepresentation and marginalization. Though they "endorse the al Qaeda message," Georgetown University scholar C. Christine Fair writes, summarizing the article, "they appear to motivate cadres and leaders by focusing on the plight of India's Muslims rather than those of the larger Muslim world."
B. Raman, the former head of counterterrorism for India's foreign intelligence service, notes repeatedly in his memoirs that the 1992 mosque destruction "marked an important watershed in the attitude of sections of the Muslim youth" who were rendered into "fertile soil" for jihadi ideology. Before that point, there had been no jihadi terrorism on Indian soil outside of Kashmir.
This is not an argument for making excuses for terrorism, or a call for India to appease its neofundamentalists. Nor is this about money, as Swami notes elsewhere, as it can only be a short-term fix to deep problems of alienation and humiliation. Plainly put, India needs to do a better job in treating its 138 million Muslims equally under the law, thereby denying jihadi claims the ideological traction they seek.
...But foreign-fed
A closer look at IM's makeup, however, undercuts the facile notion that better communal relations would cause its hardcore adherents to disintegrate, or that we can make easy distinctions between "homegrown" and "foreign" militancy.
The IM was more than just an armed Indian student group. Its birth was midwifed by the LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami Bangladesh, as well as organized crime networks linked to Pakistan. The 2006 bombings of Mumbai trains that killed 209 were, according to Georgetown's Fair, "an LeT operation outsourced through SIMI," the earlier incarnation of IM. In an authoritative study of the groups, she notes that the LeT "serves as a provider of logistical and ideological infrastructure to the regional jihadist movement."
In South Asia's complex terrorist stew, it's often hard to distinguish one organization from another. For instance, in 2002, around 14 IM recruits from Hyderabad were trained in the Pakistani camps of LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, a related group. It strains credulity to suppose that this was not done with the approval of the Pakistani spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. When an IM bomb factory was raided in October 2009, the bombmaker fled to a LeT safe house in Karachi. He returned to bomb a bakery in Pune in February 2010.
In other words, "homegrown" doesn't necessarily mean "domestic." LeT and its backers in the Pakistani state have every incentive to give their covert war against India an indigenous face. The Indian Mujahideen may have been born of India's communalism, but it was weaned on the unrelenting militancy of a certain country to the north.
In Ahmadis' desert city, #pakistan closes in #persecution
By Myra MacDonald
RABWAH, Pakistan | Thu Jul 14, 2011 9:34pm EDT
RABWAH, Pakistan (Reuters) - At the office of what claims to be one of Pakistan's oldest newspapers, workers scan copy for words it is not allowed to use -- words like Muslim and Islam. "The government is constantly monitoring this publication to make sure none of these words are published," explains our guide during a visit to the offices of al Fazl, the newspaper of the Ahmadiyya sect in Pakistan. This is Rabwah, the town the Ahmadis built when they fled the killings of Muslims in India at Partition in 1947, and believing themselves guided by God, chose a barren stretch of land where they hoped to make the Punjab desert bloom. Affluent and well-educated, they started out camping in tents and mud huts near the river and the railway line. Now they have a town of some 60,000 people, a jumble of one- and two-storey buildings, along with an Olympic size swimming pool, a fire service and a world class heart institute. Yet declared by the state in the 1970s to be non-Muslims, they face increasing threats of violence across Pakistan as the country strained by a weakening economy, an Islamist insurgency and internecine political feuds, fractures down sectarian and ethnic lines. "The situation is getting worse and worse," says Mirza Khurshid Ahmed, amir of the Ahmadi community in Pakistan. "The level of religious intolerance has increased considerably during the last 10 years." The town, renamed Chenabnagar by the state government since "Rabwah" comes from a verse in the Koran, is now retreating behind high walls and razor wire, awaiting the suicide bombers and fedayeen gunmen who police tell them are plotting attacks.
Last May, 86 people were killed in two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore, capital of Punjab; others were attacked elsewhere in the province. Many fled to Rabwah where the community gives them cheap housing and financial support. Among them is 15-year-old Iqra from Narewal, whose shopkeeper father was stabbed to death last year as the family slept. "I was sleeping in another room when my father was attacked," she begins in a small voice, pulling a black scarf across her face to cover her mouth in the style of Ahmadi women.
"The attacker wanted to kill all the Ahmadis in Narewal," her brother Zeeshan continues. "My elder brother tried to help my father and he was stabbed and wounded too." Later police found the attacker hiding in a mosque. He had believed the mullahs when they told him that all Ahmadis were "wajib ul qatl," or deserving of death.
BATTLEGROUND FOR POWER
The Ahmadis follow the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who in the town of Qadian in late 19th century British India called for a revival of a "true Islam" of peace and justice. His teachings were controversial with Muslims and Christians alike.
He argued that Jesus did not die on the cross but escaped and travelled to India and was buried in Kashmir. And he claimed to be the metaphorical second coming of Jesus, destined to put Muslims back on the true path. Many Muslims were offended by the suggestion he had come as a prophet, breaching a basic tenet of Islam that there can be no prophet after Mohammad, whose teachings are believed to be based literally on the word of God, perfect and therefore final.
Yet his call for peace, hard work, temperance, education and strong community bonds resonated, and over the years the proselytizing movement acquired millions of followers worldwide.
At home, however, their history has been intimately bound up in Pakistan's own descent from its relatively optimistic birth.
Lacking a coherent national identity, it has become a battleground for competing political, religious and ethnic groups seeking power by attacking others. "The mistake of the Ahmadis was that they showed their political strength," said an Ahmadi businessman in Lahore.
Better education he said, meant they obtained good positions in the army and civil service at first; strong community bonds made them an influential force in politics up to the 1970s.
But they also made an easy target for the religious right who could whip up anti-Ahmadi sentiment for political gain.
Ahmadis follow two different schools of thinking, but will argue, often with detailed references to the Koran in both Arabic and English, that they do not dispute the finality of the Prophet Mohammad. Their erudite theological arguments, however,
had little chance against the power of the street. After anti-Ahmadi violence, they were declared non-Muslims in 1974. In the 1980s, their humiliation was completed when legal provisions barred them from associating themselves with Islam, for example by using the call to prayer or naming their place of worship a "masjid" or mosque. "You can say you don't consider me to be a Muslim but you can't force me to also say I am not a Muslim," complains Ahmed, the amir, the pain clear in his voice. Yet in the newspaper office in Rabwah, a white board displays the words they are not allowed to use -- they could be accused of blasphemy, which carries the death penalty.
RABWAH, Pakistan | Thu Jul 14, 2011 9:34pm EDT
RABWAH, Pakistan (Reuters) - At the office of what claims to be one of Pakistan's oldest newspapers, workers scan copy for words it is not allowed to use -- words like Muslim and Islam. "The government is constantly monitoring this publication to make sure none of these words are published," explains our guide during a visit to the offices of al Fazl, the newspaper of the Ahmadiyya sect in Pakistan. This is Rabwah, the town the Ahmadis built when they fled the killings of Muslims in India at Partition in 1947, and believing themselves guided by God, chose a barren stretch of land where they hoped to make the Punjab desert bloom. Affluent and well-educated, they started out camping in tents and mud huts near the river and the railway line. Now they have a town of some 60,000 people, a jumble of one- and two-storey buildings, along with an Olympic size swimming pool, a fire service and a world class heart institute. Yet declared by the state in the 1970s to be non-Muslims, they face increasing threats of violence across Pakistan as the country strained by a weakening economy, an Islamist insurgency and internecine political feuds, fractures down sectarian and ethnic lines. "The situation is getting worse and worse," says Mirza Khurshid Ahmed, amir of the Ahmadi community in Pakistan. "The level of religious intolerance has increased considerably during the last 10 years." The town, renamed Chenabnagar by the state government since "Rabwah" comes from a verse in the Koran, is now retreating behind high walls and razor wire, awaiting the suicide bombers and fedayeen gunmen who police tell them are plotting attacks.
Last May, 86 people were killed in two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore, capital of Punjab; others were attacked elsewhere in the province. Many fled to Rabwah where the community gives them cheap housing and financial support. Among them is 15-year-old Iqra from Narewal, whose shopkeeper father was stabbed to death last year as the family slept. "I was sleeping in another room when my father was attacked," she begins in a small voice, pulling a black scarf across her face to cover her mouth in the style of Ahmadi women.
"The attacker wanted to kill all the Ahmadis in Narewal," her brother Zeeshan continues. "My elder brother tried to help my father and he was stabbed and wounded too." Later police found the attacker hiding in a mosque. He had believed the mullahs when they told him that all Ahmadis were "wajib ul qatl," or deserving of death.
BATTLEGROUND FOR POWER
The Ahmadis follow the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who in the town of Qadian in late 19th century British India called for a revival of a "true Islam" of peace and justice. His teachings were controversial with Muslims and Christians alike.
He argued that Jesus did not die on the cross but escaped and travelled to India and was buried in Kashmir. And he claimed to be the metaphorical second coming of Jesus, destined to put Muslims back on the true path. Many Muslims were offended by the suggestion he had come as a prophet, breaching a basic tenet of Islam that there can be no prophet after Mohammad, whose teachings are believed to be based literally on the word of God, perfect and therefore final.
Yet his call for peace, hard work, temperance, education and strong community bonds resonated, and over the years the proselytizing movement acquired millions of followers worldwide.
At home, however, their history has been intimately bound up in Pakistan's own descent from its relatively optimistic birth.
Lacking a coherent national identity, it has become a battleground for competing political, religious and ethnic groups seeking power by attacking others. "The mistake of the Ahmadis was that they showed their political strength," said an Ahmadi businessman in Lahore.
Better education he said, meant they obtained good positions in the army and civil service at first; strong community bonds made them an influential force in politics up to the 1970s.
But they also made an easy target for the religious right who could whip up anti-Ahmadi sentiment for political gain.
Ahmadis follow two different schools of thinking, but will argue, often with detailed references to the Koran in both Arabic and English, that they do not dispute the finality of the Prophet Mohammad. Their erudite theological arguments, however,
had little chance against the power of the street. After anti-Ahmadi violence, they were declared non-Muslims in 1974. In the 1980s, their humiliation was completed when legal provisions barred them from associating themselves with Islam, for example by using the call to prayer or naming their place of worship a "masjid" or mosque. "You can say you don't consider me to be a Muslim but you can't force me to also say I am not a Muslim," complains Ahmed, the amir, the pain clear in his voice. Yet in the newspaper office in Rabwah, a white board displays the words they are not allowed to use -- they could be accused of blasphemy, which carries the death penalty.
Energy crisis threatens to derail #pakistan's growth
By Shahzeb Jillani BBC News, Karachi
Pakistan has a serious electricity problem. Ask Mohammed Yasin, who sells sugarcane juice from a small, rented shop in Karachi's Neelum Colony.
For months, his business has been suffering because of unplanned power outages, often lasting eight to ten hours.
"I got fed up and finally had to buy this run-down diesel generator," he says pointing to the noisy equipment that is helping turn the wheel of his cane-crushing machine.
"The costs of a diesel generator are a major dent in my earnings, but what else can I do?" he asks.
Mohammed is only one of millions who have been affected in Pakistan; a country where power cuts have become a national frustration, often overshadowing concerns about Pakistan's security situation.
Spontaneous protests by citizens fed up with power blackouts have become an almost daily occurrence in cities and towns across the country.
Television channels regularly show pictures of people setting tyres on fire and shouting slogans to vent their anger at the authorities.
Earlier this month, a demonstration in front of a nuclear power plant in the city of Mianwali, Punjab, turned into a riot.
Industry leaders say power cuts are slowing Pakistan's already struggling economy even further, forcing factory closures and putting thousands out of work.
Supply vs demand
The main reason given for Pakistan's problems is simple; energy supplies have struggled to keep pace with economic growth.
Fawad Khan, an energy analyst with a leading investment firm in Karachi, says that in 2008 Pakistan used to cut power for an average of three hours a day to regulate supply.
However, by 2010 that downtime had grown to six hours on average.
Now, unless drastic action is taken, many fear the blackouts will just get longer and longer.
Analysts say another factor adding to the problems is Pakistan's reliance on oil-based electricity. This has grown from 16% of total output in 2005 to 38% in 2010.
Critics say Pakistan has so far lagged behind in developing cleaner sources of energy as an alternative to the more expensive imported fuel and its own limited gas reserves.
"Most countries in the region like India, Nepal, Bangladesh are facing energy shortages, but our problem is probably the worst," says Aziz Memon, a leading textile industrialist.
Mr Menon says a lack of planning and investment in new power generation has deepened the crisis.
"We have problems of infrastructure, inefficiency and decades of mismanagement," he says.
Internal issues
Karachi, a city of 18 million people and Pakistan's main economic hub, used to be known as "the city of lights".
Today, large parts of it are regularly plunged into darkness.
As well as the perennial problems of creaking infrastructure and a lack of investment, other factors are also conspiring to pull the plug on supplies.
Over the past few months, the city's main electricity provider, the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC), has been locked in a nasty industrial dispute with the unions over job cuts.
The corporation is trying to lay off 4,500 of workers in an attempt to cut costs and improve efficiency. The employees are fighting back by camping outside the company's head offices as part of an indefinite strike.
As the stand-off drags on, millions of Karachi residents are turning to less regulated ways of getting energy, not least because when they can get power they are often having to pay more for it.
With electricity costs on the rise, pushed up by higher global commodity prices and internal inflation, a growing number of people are stealing the power they need by rigging ad-hoc wires and power meters.
The KESC says it is working on generating and supplying more electricity, but admits it has not had much success in trying to curb distribution losses.
"Despite improvements in some areas, one problem still remains," says Ghufran Atta Khan, a spokesman for KESC. "And that is, we haven't been able to stop about 30% of our electricity from being stolen through illegal connections."
Back at the juice shop there is still no power and the expensive diesel generator is chugging along.
Mohammed Yasin is honest about the stark business choices he faces.
And while he says he will resist the temptation to steal electricity, many others seem unwilling to wait for Pakistan's energy revolution to arrive.
Pakistan has a serious electricity problem. Ask Mohammed Yasin, who sells sugarcane juice from a small, rented shop in Karachi's Neelum Colony.
For months, his business has been suffering because of unplanned power outages, often lasting eight to ten hours.
"I got fed up and finally had to buy this run-down diesel generator," he says pointing to the noisy equipment that is helping turn the wheel of his cane-crushing machine.
"The costs of a diesel generator are a major dent in my earnings, but what else can I do?" he asks.
Mohammed is only one of millions who have been affected in Pakistan; a country where power cuts have become a national frustration, often overshadowing concerns about Pakistan's security situation.
Spontaneous protests by citizens fed up with power blackouts have become an almost daily occurrence in cities and towns across the country.
Television channels regularly show pictures of people setting tyres on fire and shouting slogans to vent their anger at the authorities.
Earlier this month, a demonstration in front of a nuclear power plant in the city of Mianwali, Punjab, turned into a riot.
Industry leaders say power cuts are slowing Pakistan's already struggling economy even further, forcing factory closures and putting thousands out of work.
Supply vs demand
The main reason given for Pakistan's problems is simple; energy supplies have struggled to keep pace with economic growth.
Fawad Khan, an energy analyst with a leading investment firm in Karachi, says that in 2008 Pakistan used to cut power for an average of three hours a day to regulate supply.
However, by 2010 that downtime had grown to six hours on average.
Now, unless drastic action is taken, many fear the blackouts will just get longer and longer.
Analysts say another factor adding to the problems is Pakistan's reliance on oil-based electricity. This has grown from 16% of total output in 2005 to 38% in 2010.
Critics say Pakistan has so far lagged behind in developing cleaner sources of energy as an alternative to the more expensive imported fuel and its own limited gas reserves.
"Most countries in the region like India, Nepal, Bangladesh are facing energy shortages, but our problem is probably the worst," says Aziz Memon, a leading textile industrialist.
Mr Menon says a lack of planning and investment in new power generation has deepened the crisis.
"We have problems of infrastructure, inefficiency and decades of mismanagement," he says.
Internal issues
Karachi, a city of 18 million people and Pakistan's main economic hub, used to be known as "the city of lights".
Today, large parts of it are regularly plunged into darkness.
As well as the perennial problems of creaking infrastructure and a lack of investment, other factors are also conspiring to pull the plug on supplies.
Over the past few months, the city's main electricity provider, the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC), has been locked in a nasty industrial dispute with the unions over job cuts.
The corporation is trying to lay off 4,500 of workers in an attempt to cut costs and improve efficiency. The employees are fighting back by camping outside the company's head offices as part of an indefinite strike.
As the stand-off drags on, millions of Karachi residents are turning to less regulated ways of getting energy, not least because when they can get power they are often having to pay more for it.
With electricity costs on the rise, pushed up by higher global commodity prices and internal inflation, a growing number of people are stealing the power they need by rigging ad-hoc wires and power meters.
The KESC says it is working on generating and supplying more electricity, but admits it has not had much success in trying to curb distribution losses.
"Despite improvements in some areas, one problem still remains," says Ghufran Atta Khan, a spokesman for KESC. "And that is, we haven't been able to stop about 30% of our electricity from being stolen through illegal connections."
Back at the juice shop there is still no power and the expensive diesel generator is chugging along.
Mohammed Yasin is honest about the stark business choices he faces.
And while he says he will resist the temptation to steal electricity, many others seem unwilling to wait for Pakistan's energy revolution to arrive.
#pakistan’s exclusion from World Junior Squash a (Zionist?) conspiracy
ISLAMABAD: Expressing his dismay over Pakistan’s exclusion from the World Junior Squash Championships, the sport’s legend Qamar Zaman on Wednesday said the country’s absence from the event was the result of a well thought-out plot.
“This [Pakistan’s exclusion] is a conspiracy. Our boys had undergone very hard training and were looking sharp. They were fully capable of clinching the title but they have been deprived of that,” Qamar said on Wednesday.
Meanwhile, the 18th World Junior Championships, managed by the World Squash Federation (WSF), commenced at the Flemish Squash Centre in Herentals, Belgium on Wednesday.
Pakistan’s Danish Atlas Khan and Nasir Iqbal, both 17-year-olds from Peshawar, were originally named as the two 3/4 seeds. Danish is the reigning Asian junior champion, with three PSA World Tour titles to his credit, while Iqbal, a former Asian U-15 champion, already boasts two Tour titles. But they were forced to withdraw from the July 13-17 event following problems in obtaining the visas.
Qamar said it was really disappointing to see Pakistan players not featuring in the event, especially when they had fair chances of winning.
He reckoned the Pakistan Squash Federation (PSF) should not be blamed for the players’ exclusion from the world junior event as it had selected the squad for the said contest well in time besides intimating the WSF about the same.
“I have come to know that the PSF – despite its repeated reminders to the WSF – got visa letters from them on June 30. Thus, it was too late for them [PSF] to obtain visas from the Belgium Embassy,” Qamar remarked.
He believed the WSF was responsible for Pakistan’s omission from the global competition, urging the PSF must lodge a strong protest with the game’s world governing body.
However, he was of the view that Belgian Embassy in Pakistan too had not treated players fairly and denied them visas.
“I think keeping in view importance of the event they [Belgian Embassy] should have accommodated the Pakistan players,” he said.—Agencies
“This [Pakistan’s exclusion] is a conspiracy. Our boys had undergone very hard training and were looking sharp. They were fully capable of clinching the title but they have been deprived of that,” Qamar said on Wednesday.
Meanwhile, the 18th World Junior Championships, managed by the World Squash Federation (WSF), commenced at the Flemish Squash Centre in Herentals, Belgium on Wednesday.
Pakistan’s Danish Atlas Khan and Nasir Iqbal, both 17-year-olds from Peshawar, were originally named as the two 3/4 seeds. Danish is the reigning Asian junior champion, with three PSA World Tour titles to his credit, while Iqbal, a former Asian U-15 champion, already boasts two Tour titles. But they were forced to withdraw from the July 13-17 event following problems in obtaining the visas.
Qamar said it was really disappointing to see Pakistan players not featuring in the event, especially when they had fair chances of winning.
He reckoned the Pakistan Squash Federation (PSF) should not be blamed for the players’ exclusion from the world junior event as it had selected the squad for the said contest well in time besides intimating the WSF about the same.
“I have come to know that the PSF – despite its repeated reminders to the WSF – got visa letters from them on June 30. Thus, it was too late for them [PSF] to obtain visas from the Belgium Embassy,” Qamar remarked.
He believed the WSF was responsible for Pakistan’s omission from the global competition, urging the PSF must lodge a strong protest with the game’s world governing body.
However, he was of the view that Belgian Embassy in Pakistan too had not treated players fairly and denied them visas.
“I think keeping in view importance of the event they [Belgian Embassy] should have accommodated the Pakistan players,” he said.—Agencies
No honest people in #pakistan
mran Khan reminds me of the sons of textile tycoons who go to America for studies and come back empty-handed, either with a basic undergraduate degree and sometimes not even that. They do, however, return with a good English language accent. Their parents help them set up industries to run and most of them fail. And when these companies default, they always blame everything/one else but themselves.
Imran Khan says he will end corruption in 100 days if he comes to power. Most of the corruption in Pakistan, contrary to popular perception, exists at the lower levels. About half of the students in Pakistani colleges cheat. Once they graduate many go on to become (mostly corrupt) junior government officers. Almost all policemen in Pakistan take bribes. So do most Pakistani tax and customs officials. So do the people in the army responsible for procurement. Look at the prices Pakistan paid for F-16s and French military equipment, and look at the prices Taiwan paid for similar planes and equipment.
Many of the Frontier Corps junior officers managing our checkposts allow drug smugglers to pass from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and of course this is done in exchange for money. Our Supreme Court is excellent and perhaps the one good thing we have left. But the lower courts are in a shambles and people have to wait for years for their cases to reach an end. Our city and municipal services officials responsible for things like road building, drainage and water works are generally corrupt, as are those who serve in Wapda and Pakistan Railways. The list can go and on but I hope readers get what I am saying.
Where would Imran Khan get not only qualified people to replace these corrupt people, but also people who are honest? They simply don’t exist.
Imran is loved by our urban youth, mostly young men with limited knowledge, who want power. They think they can run the country with someone like him at its helm but they have no experience of such things. Right now, Imran Khan has no economic team and does not have a sizeable number of honest and seasoned politicians with him, despite being in politics for over a decade.
A Ahmed
Imran Khan says he will end corruption in 100 days if he comes to power. Most of the corruption in Pakistan, contrary to popular perception, exists at the lower levels. About half of the students in Pakistani colleges cheat. Once they graduate many go on to become (mostly corrupt) junior government officers. Almost all policemen in Pakistan take bribes. So do most Pakistani tax and customs officials. So do the people in the army responsible for procurement. Look at the prices Pakistan paid for F-16s and French military equipment, and look at the prices Taiwan paid for similar planes and equipment.
Many of the Frontier Corps junior officers managing our checkposts allow drug smugglers to pass from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and of course this is done in exchange for money. Our Supreme Court is excellent and perhaps the one good thing we have left. But the lower courts are in a shambles and people have to wait for years for their cases to reach an end. Our city and municipal services officials responsible for things like road building, drainage and water works are generally corrupt, as are those who serve in Wapda and Pakistan Railways. The list can go and on but I hope readers get what I am saying.
Where would Imran Khan get not only qualified people to replace these corrupt people, but also people who are honest? They simply don’t exist.
Imran is loved by our urban youth, mostly young men with limited knowledge, who want power. They think they can run the country with someone like him at its helm but they have no experience of such things. Right now, Imran Khan has no economic team and does not have a sizeable number of honest and seasoned politicians with him, despite being in politics for over a decade.
A Ahmed
#pakistan Central Banker Resigns in Economic Blow
ISLAMABAD—Pakistan's central bank governor resigned because of policy differences with the government over the country's mounting budget deficit, dealing a further blow to the nation's already bleak economic outlook.
Shahid Kardar, who had been governor for less than a year, was a vocal critic of the government's failure to contain a widening deficit, which was 6% of gross domestic product in the fiscal year ended June 30.
A person close to Mr. Kardar confirmed he had handed in his resignation to Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari. Attempts to reach Mr. Kardar weren't successful. A spokesman for Mr. Zardari declined to comment. Mr. Kardar will remain central bank governor until his resignation is officially accepted.
The resignation of Mr. Kardar, who was respected by Pakistan's foreign donors, further complicates the economic picture for a country highly dependent on International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans.
Pakistan's elite pay some of the lowest taxes in the world, but the state pays out huge subsidies on the consumption of oil and other commodities. To fund the mounting deficit, the government has been borrowing from the central bank, essentially printing money and stoking annual inflation to about 13%.
In protest at Pakistan's failure to raise more taxes, the IMF since last year has withheld the disbursement of $3.5 billion in funding, part of a $11.3 billion balance of payments support package.
Pakistan called in the IMF in 2008 amid a balance-of-payments crisis, which has since abated due to strong commodity exports.
The government pledged last month in its budget for the current fiscal year to end some tax exemptions and bring more people into the tax net. But it stopped short of expanding its sales tax to include services, an immediate measure demanded by the IMF.
Currently, Pakistan's tax haul amounts to only 9% of GDP, one of the lowest ratios anywhere. Only two million Pakistanis from a population of 180 million pay income tax, while the government relies on donor loans to fill its deficit.
The World Bank and Asian Development Bank also have suspended budget-support loans amounting to $1 billion in protest at the slow pace of the tax overhaul.
Pakistan and IMF officials are due to meet later this month to review progress in implementing changes, but with little sign of progress it's unlikely to produce an agreement.
An Oxford University-educated economist, Mr. Kardar, 58 years old, took up the post in September after Salim Raza, the previous governor, resigned before completion of his tenure. The central bank governor normally has a three-year term.
Last year, Shaukat Tareen, the former finance minister, also resigned, citing widespread government corruption.
Shahid Kardar, who had been governor for less than a year, was a vocal critic of the government's failure to contain a widening deficit, which was 6% of gross domestic product in the fiscal year ended June 30.
A person close to Mr. Kardar confirmed he had handed in his resignation to Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari. Attempts to reach Mr. Kardar weren't successful. A spokesman for Mr. Zardari declined to comment. Mr. Kardar will remain central bank governor until his resignation is officially accepted.
The resignation of Mr. Kardar, who was respected by Pakistan's foreign donors, further complicates the economic picture for a country highly dependent on International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans.
Pakistan's elite pay some of the lowest taxes in the world, but the state pays out huge subsidies on the consumption of oil and other commodities. To fund the mounting deficit, the government has been borrowing from the central bank, essentially printing money and stoking annual inflation to about 13%.
In protest at Pakistan's failure to raise more taxes, the IMF since last year has withheld the disbursement of $3.5 billion in funding, part of a $11.3 billion balance of payments support package.
Pakistan called in the IMF in 2008 amid a balance-of-payments crisis, which has since abated due to strong commodity exports.
The government pledged last month in its budget for the current fiscal year to end some tax exemptions and bring more people into the tax net. But it stopped short of expanding its sales tax to include services, an immediate measure demanded by the IMF.
Currently, Pakistan's tax haul amounts to only 9% of GDP, one of the lowest ratios anywhere. Only two million Pakistanis from a population of 180 million pay income tax, while the government relies on donor loans to fill its deficit.
The World Bank and Asian Development Bank also have suspended budget-support loans amounting to $1 billion in protest at the slow pace of the tax overhaul.
Pakistan and IMF officials are due to meet later this month to review progress in implementing changes, but with little sign of progress it's unlikely to produce an agreement.
An Oxford University-educated economist, Mr. Kardar, 58 years old, took up the post in September after Salim Raza, the previous governor, resigned before completion of his tenure. The central bank governor normally has a three-year term.
Last year, Shaukat Tareen, the former finance minister, also resigned, citing widespread government corruption.
#pakistan: A Failed State?
The term failed state is often used to describe a state perceived as having failed to meet some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of sovereign government. In international law, a failed state is one that, “though retaining legal capacity, has for all practical purposes lost the ability to exercise it.” According to the Fund for Peace that just released its seventh annual Failed State Index (FSI), a failed state is characterized by:
loss of physical control of its territory or loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force;
the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;
an inability to provide reasonable public services; and
an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.
The FSI is made up of 12 social, economic and political indicators − each split into an average of 14 sub-indicators. The Fund for Peace bases its assessment primarily on content analysis of thousands of electronically available articles and reports that are processed by special software.
According to the latest index scores, Pakistan ranks 12th out of 177 countries examined. Looking at the indicators used for the ranking, Pakistan’s worst scoring categories were: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (9.2), Group Grievance (9.3), Security Apparatus (9.4), External Interventions (9.3), Legitimacy of the State (8.6), and Uneven Economic Development (8.5).
Indeed, Pakistan faces many challenges. Since 9/11, 35,000 Pakistanis have died in suicide bombings, with an average of more than one such bombing a week. Most observers agree that the situation is dire: clearly, much development work and reforms of the government and security sectors are badly needed. But is Pakistan a “failed state” as we commonly understand it: does it meet the above definition?
The first criterion above is the inability to physically (and legitimately) control territory. In Pakistan’s north-western regions, along the border with Afghanistan, tribal militants and the Taliban are actively challenging the government’s physical control. In the south-west, Pakistan is close to losing one of its biggest provinces − Balochistan – to a bloody insurgency that openly seeks independence. (It was in this province, by the way, that two Swiss tourists were kidnapped on 1 July 2011 and are still being held hostage.) And while one tends to think of Pakistan’s military as a more professional, secular organization, the evidence now clearly shows that it has been infiltrated by violent Islamist, insurgent and terrorist groups at basically all levels.
On point two, Pakistan fares no better. Throughout the country, there is an almost complete absence of legitimate authority and institutional mechanisms for decision-making. Most decisions are made by the President himself who also tends to personally conduct Pakistani diplomacy. Coordination between different branches of government is also virtually non-existent.
And on point three, there is no question. Pakistan does not provide reasonable public services to all or at least most of its citizens (which flows directly from its lack of territorial control). Even in Karachi, the country’s biggest city, the authorities are unable to provide even a minimum of personal security, with an average of 4.7 murders in the city every night– most of which are politically motivated. And due to ongoing military operations and militant activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in north-west Pakistan, there has been enormous internal displacement of persons.
On the fourth point, however, Pakistan passes. It is active in many international organizations and regularly takes part in high-level multilateral and bilateral talks − US air-strikes in the country notwithstanding.
Is Pakistan a failed state? Somehow the table of perceptions seems to stand – as if magically suspended by this single leg. Perhaps the matter is ultimately a semantic one, but it should surprise no one that this fourth criterion has come in for some heavy criticism.
One wonders how any state that wants to satisfy it could fail to do so.
loss of physical control of its territory or loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force;
the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;
an inability to provide reasonable public services; and
an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.
The FSI is made up of 12 social, economic and political indicators − each split into an average of 14 sub-indicators. The Fund for Peace bases its assessment primarily on content analysis of thousands of electronically available articles and reports that are processed by special software.
According to the latest index scores, Pakistan ranks 12th out of 177 countries examined. Looking at the indicators used for the ranking, Pakistan’s worst scoring categories were: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (9.2), Group Grievance (9.3), Security Apparatus (9.4), External Interventions (9.3), Legitimacy of the State (8.6), and Uneven Economic Development (8.5).
Indeed, Pakistan faces many challenges. Since 9/11, 35,000 Pakistanis have died in suicide bombings, with an average of more than one such bombing a week. Most observers agree that the situation is dire: clearly, much development work and reforms of the government and security sectors are badly needed. But is Pakistan a “failed state” as we commonly understand it: does it meet the above definition?
The first criterion above is the inability to physically (and legitimately) control territory. In Pakistan’s north-western regions, along the border with Afghanistan, tribal militants and the Taliban are actively challenging the government’s physical control. In the south-west, Pakistan is close to losing one of its biggest provinces − Balochistan – to a bloody insurgency that openly seeks independence. (It was in this province, by the way, that two Swiss tourists were kidnapped on 1 July 2011 and are still being held hostage.) And while one tends to think of Pakistan’s military as a more professional, secular organization, the evidence now clearly shows that it has been infiltrated by violent Islamist, insurgent and terrorist groups at basically all levels.
On point two, Pakistan fares no better. Throughout the country, there is an almost complete absence of legitimate authority and institutional mechanisms for decision-making. Most decisions are made by the President himself who also tends to personally conduct Pakistani diplomacy. Coordination between different branches of government is also virtually non-existent.
And on point three, there is no question. Pakistan does not provide reasonable public services to all or at least most of its citizens (which flows directly from its lack of territorial control). Even in Karachi, the country’s biggest city, the authorities are unable to provide even a minimum of personal security, with an average of 4.7 murders in the city every night– most of which are politically motivated. And due to ongoing military operations and militant activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in north-west Pakistan, there has been enormous internal displacement of persons.
On the fourth point, however, Pakistan passes. It is active in many international organizations and regularly takes part in high-level multilateral and bilateral talks − US air-strikes in the country notwithstanding.
Is Pakistan a failed state? Somehow the table of perceptions seems to stand – as if magically suspended by this single leg. Perhaps the matter is ultimately a semantic one, but it should surprise no one that this fourth criterion has come in for some heavy criticism.
One wonders how any state that wants to satisfy it could fail to do so.
#Pakistan: Upsurge in Killings & abuse in #Balochistan by Military & Paramilitary Troops #humanrights #persecution
(New York) - Pakistan's government should immediately act to end the epidemic of killings of suspected Baloch militants and opposition activists by the military, intelligence agencies, and the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the southwestern province of Balochistan, Human Rights Watch said today.
Across Balochistan since January 2011, at least 150 people have been abducted and killed and their bodies abandoned - acts widely referred to as "kill and dump" operations, in which Pakistani security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations may be responsible. Assailants have also carried out targeted killings of opposition leaders and activists. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented enforced disappearances by Pakistan's security forces in Balochistan, including several cases in which those "disappeared" have been found dead. (See appendix.)
"The surge in unlawful killings of suspected militants and opposition figures in Balochistan has taken the brutality in the province to an unprecedented level," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The government should investigate all those responsible, especially in the military and Frontier Corps, and hold them accountable."
In the first 10 days of July, nine bullet-riddled bodies, several of them bearing marks of torture, were discovered in the province, Human Rights Watch said. On July 1, the body of Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, was found in an abandoned hotel in the town of Gadani, in the Lasbela district. The local police told the media that, "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture." Lango had been abducted by men in civilian clothes in Karachi, in Sindh province, on December 11, 2009. When Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction, the police refused to take it. An officer told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and that the "authorities" wanted to restrain him from participating in politics.
Hanif Baloch, an activist with the Baloch Students Organisation (Azad), was abducted from the town of Hub, Lasbela district, on July 4. His body was found in Mach, Bolan district on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body. On the same day in Kech district, the bodies of Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, a resident of Mand, were found dumped in Juzak, on the outskirts of the town of Turbat. Both had been shot dead under unknown circumstances.
While Baloch nationalist leaders and activists have long been targeted by the Pakistani security forces, since the beginning of 2011, human rights activists and academics critical of the military have also been killed, Human Rights Watch said. Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), was abducted with another man by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010 from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district.
The bodies of both men, bearing marks of torture, were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28. HRCP said that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" in response to Eido's death amounted to "collusion" in his killing. Earlier, on March 1, an HRCP coordinator for the city of Khuzdar, Naeem Sabir district, was shot and killed by unknown assailants.
On June 1, Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch writer and poet, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the provincial capital, Quetta. Dashtiyari had publicly backed the cause of an independent Balochistan.
"Even the cold-blooded killing of human rights defenders and academics has not moved the Pakistani government to seriously investigate, rein in, or hold the security forces to account in Balochistan," Adams said. "The government's failure to open a credible investigation into the killing of someone as prominent as Saba Dashtiyari only adds fuel to the fire of anger and suspicion in the province."
Armed militant groups in Balochistan are responsible for killing many civilians and destroying private property. In the past several years, they have increasingly targeted non-Baloch civilians and their businesses, police stations, and major gas installations and infrastructure. They have also attacked security forces and military bases throughout the province. Abuses by militants in Balochistan were documented by Human Rights Watch in a December 2010 report "Their Future is at Stake."
Human Rights Watch called upon the Pakistan government to take immediate measures to end killings in Balochistan. The Pakistani authorities should conduct prompt, impartial, and transparent investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances and ensure that all those responsible, regardless of rank, are fully prosecuted, including as a matter of command responsibility. Victims of abuses by government security forces should be provided appropriate redress.
"President Asif Ali Zardari should recognize that ignoring abuses in Balochistan amounts to giving a green light to the army and intelligence agencies to commit abuses elsewhere in Pakistan," Adams said. "By failing to hold the security forces accountable for abuses in Balochistan, Pakistan's government will feed into a cycle of violence that may haunt Pakistani democracy for years to come."
Background on Balochistan and Human Rights Abuses
Balochistan has historically had a tense relationship with Pakistan's national government, in large part due to issues of provincial autonomy, control of mineral resources and exploration, and a consequent sense of deprivation. Under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler from 1999 until 2008, the situation deteriorated markedly, culminating in a crackdown on Baloch nationalists by the security agencies controlled by the Pakistani military and its lead intelligence agency in the province, Military Intelligence (MI).
Since 2005, Pakistani and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have recorded numerous serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, and forced displacement of civilians.
Militancy in Balochistan has been fuelled by ethnic Baloch anger over the Pakistani government's moves to harness local mineral and fossil fuel resources, maintain large numbers of troops in the province, and construct the Gwadar deep-sea port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf with non-Baloch workers. The Pakistani military claims that Baloch militants receive arms and financial support from India but has provided no evidence to support the claim.
In December 2009, Pakistan's newly elected civilian government, in an effort to bring about political reconciliation in the province, passed a package of constitutional, political, administrative, and economic reforms. Nonetheless, doubts persist within Baloch society about the Pakistan government's intentions. Divisions among Baloch nationalists have exacerbated lawlessness and violence in the province.
As the violence in Balochistan has intensified, atrocities have mounted. While the Pakistani military and Baloch militants readily exploit the misery of civilians for their own political purposes, they have failed to address these grievances or to accept responsibility for them.
Recent Extrajudicial Killings in Balochistan
Human Rights Watch has investigated cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Balochistan. Below are recent cases of killings that indicate involvement by the Pakistani military, its intelligence agencies, or the paramilitary Frontier Corps. There has been a notable failure by the federal government in Islamabad and the Balochistan provincial government in Quetta to investigate these cases and hold perpetrators accountable.
Enforced disappearance and killing of Abdul Ghaffar Lango
On December 11, 2009, a group of unknown men abducted Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, outside a hospital in Karachi in Sindh province.
At 3 p.m. that day, Lango was leaving the Institute of Surgery and Medicine, a hospital in Karachi, with his wife, who had just been discharged after surgery. Lango's wife told Human Rights Watch that as the couple reached the main gate, two white Toyota Vigo pickup trucks drove up at high speed in front of them and suddenly stopped. About 10 men in civilian clothes approached the couple. One beat Lango unconscious with the butt of his rifle, and Lango fell to the ground. The men then dragged him into one of the cars and drove away. Lango's wife said there were many witnesses to the incident since it took place in a crowded area in broad daylight.
Later that day, Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction at the Garden police station in Karachi, but the police refused to accept it. A police officer at the station told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and authorities wanted to restrain him from participating in politics. But the police would not provide any information on his whereabouts.
The family filed a petition with the Sindh High Court on January 12, 2010. On January 15, the court ordered the deputy attorney general and advocate general of Sindh to submit a report on Lango's whereabouts within two weeks. On March 3, Sindh Deputy Attorney General Umer Hayat Sindhu told the court on behalf of the director general of the Intelligence Bureau that Lango had not been detained or arrested by the Intelligence Bureau, which, he explained, was "only an intelligence agency that does not detain anyone for interrogation." Police representatives also told the court that Lango was not in their custody. No other security or intelligence authorities reported on Lango's whereabouts.
On July 1, 2011, Lango's body was found in an abandoned hotel near the Lakbado area of the town of Gadani, in Lasbela district of Balochistan. The local police, represented by the station house officer of the Gadani police station, told the local media: "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture. The cause of death was stated to be a severe wound in the head, caused by a hard rod or some other hard or sharp object." Lango appeared to have been recently killed.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Siddique Eido and Yusuf Nazar
Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and Yousaf Nazar, a tailor by profession, were abducted by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010 from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district. Eido and Nazar were returning from Gwadar to their native Pasni after appearing in court in a criminal case lodged against them. Seven other co-accused and four police officers were travelling with them when their van was stopped by three unlicensed vehicles. The assailants, who were in Frontier Corps uniforms, abducted Eido and Nazar at gunpoint in the presence of the police officers. The bodies of both men were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28, 2011. Both bore marks of torture.
In response to the killings and the authorities' failure to seriously investigate the case, HRCP said: "The uniforms of the abductors and the vehicles they had used gave credence to the belief that state agents were involved. Siddique had been abducted in the presence of several policemen, but despite such clear evidence no action was taken to publicly identify abductors or secure release." HRCP added that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" amounted to "collusion" in Eido's killing.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Naseer Kamalan
Naseer Kamalan was abducted at gunpoint on November 5, 2010 from a passenger van on the Makran Coastal Highway near Pasni in Gwadar district. Kamalan's fellow passengers told Human Rights Watch that his abductors were in Frontier Corps uniforms and were driving a jeep of the type commonly used by the Frontier Corps. Kamalan's body was found on January 17, 2011, dumped on the Makran Coastal Highway.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Jamil Yaqub
Jamil Yaqub was abducted in the town of Turbat on August 28, 2010 by a group of men in Frontier Corps uniforms, who had arrived in a jeep with military markings and insignia. Family members described to Human Rights Watch how they hid from the Frontier Corps personnel and then watched helplessly as Yaqub was abducted during daylight hours. Yaqub's body, bearing marks of torture, was found on February 10, 2011, on the outskirts of Turbat.
Other Killings Verified by Human Rights Watch
According to eyewitnesses, Hanif Baloch, a Baloch Students Organisation (Azad) (BSO-Azad) activist, was abducted from the town of Hub on July 4, 2011, by armed men in military uniform. His body was found on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body.
On July 6, two bodies bearing multiple bullet wounds were found dumped near Juzak on the outskirts of Turbat in Kech district. Turbat District Headquarters Hospital authorities identified them as Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, son of Muhammad Yousaf, a resident of Go Kurth area of Mand, in Panjgoor district.
On June 18, the BSO-Azad junior joint secretary, Shafi Baloch, was abducted from the Lakhpass area of Mastung district. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that Baloch was going to Mastung from Quetta in a passenger van for medical treatment when uniformed, armed men in three cars made him disembark and abducted him at gunpoint. His bullet-riddled body was found dumped near Mach, in Bolan district, 60 kilometers from Quetta.
On June 1, Prof. Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan in Quetta and an acclaimed writer and poet, was killed after being shot repeatedly by unidentified gunmen on Sariab Road in Quetta. Dashtiyari was the author of several books on Baloch culture and language and was a scholar on Islam. In recent years, he had publicly backed the cause for an armed struggle to achieve an independent Balochistan. No one has claimed responsibility for Dashtiyari's killing.
Across Balochistan since January 2011, at least 150 people have been abducted and killed and their bodies abandoned - acts widely referred to as "kill and dump" operations, in which Pakistani security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations may be responsible. Assailants have also carried out targeted killings of opposition leaders and activists. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented enforced disappearances by Pakistan's security forces in Balochistan, including several cases in which those "disappeared" have been found dead. (See appendix.)
"The surge in unlawful killings of suspected militants and opposition figures in Balochistan has taken the brutality in the province to an unprecedented level," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The government should investigate all those responsible, especially in the military and Frontier Corps, and hold them accountable."
In the first 10 days of July, nine bullet-riddled bodies, several of them bearing marks of torture, were discovered in the province, Human Rights Watch said. On July 1, the body of Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, was found in an abandoned hotel in the town of Gadani, in the Lasbela district. The local police told the media that, "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture." Lango had been abducted by men in civilian clothes in Karachi, in Sindh province, on December 11, 2009. When Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction, the police refused to take it. An officer told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and that the "authorities" wanted to restrain him from participating in politics.
Hanif Baloch, an activist with the Baloch Students Organisation (Azad), was abducted from the town of Hub, Lasbela district, on July 4. His body was found in Mach, Bolan district on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body. On the same day in Kech district, the bodies of Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, a resident of Mand, were found dumped in Juzak, on the outskirts of the town of Turbat. Both had been shot dead under unknown circumstances.
While Baloch nationalist leaders and activists have long been targeted by the Pakistani security forces, since the beginning of 2011, human rights activists and academics critical of the military have also been killed, Human Rights Watch said. Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), was abducted with another man by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010 from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district.
The bodies of both men, bearing marks of torture, were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28. HRCP said that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" in response to Eido's death amounted to "collusion" in his killing. Earlier, on March 1, an HRCP coordinator for the city of Khuzdar, Naeem Sabir district, was shot and killed by unknown assailants.
On June 1, Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch writer and poet, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the provincial capital, Quetta. Dashtiyari had publicly backed the cause of an independent Balochistan.
"Even the cold-blooded killing of human rights defenders and academics has not moved the Pakistani government to seriously investigate, rein in, or hold the security forces to account in Balochistan," Adams said. "The government's failure to open a credible investigation into the killing of someone as prominent as Saba Dashtiyari only adds fuel to the fire of anger and suspicion in the province."
Armed militant groups in Balochistan are responsible for killing many civilians and destroying private property. In the past several years, they have increasingly targeted non-Baloch civilians and their businesses, police stations, and major gas installations and infrastructure. They have also attacked security forces and military bases throughout the province. Abuses by militants in Balochistan were documented by Human Rights Watch in a December 2010 report "Their Future is at Stake."
Human Rights Watch called upon the Pakistan government to take immediate measures to end killings in Balochistan. The Pakistani authorities should conduct prompt, impartial, and transparent investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances and ensure that all those responsible, regardless of rank, are fully prosecuted, including as a matter of command responsibility. Victims of abuses by government security forces should be provided appropriate redress.
"President Asif Ali Zardari should recognize that ignoring abuses in Balochistan amounts to giving a green light to the army and intelligence agencies to commit abuses elsewhere in Pakistan," Adams said. "By failing to hold the security forces accountable for abuses in Balochistan, Pakistan's government will feed into a cycle of violence that may haunt Pakistani democracy for years to come."
Background on Balochistan and Human Rights Abuses
Balochistan has historically had a tense relationship with Pakistan's national government, in large part due to issues of provincial autonomy, control of mineral resources and exploration, and a consequent sense of deprivation. Under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler from 1999 until 2008, the situation deteriorated markedly, culminating in a crackdown on Baloch nationalists by the security agencies controlled by the Pakistani military and its lead intelligence agency in the province, Military Intelligence (MI).
Since 2005, Pakistani and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have recorded numerous serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, and forced displacement of civilians.
Militancy in Balochistan has been fuelled by ethnic Baloch anger over the Pakistani government's moves to harness local mineral and fossil fuel resources, maintain large numbers of troops in the province, and construct the Gwadar deep-sea port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf with non-Baloch workers. The Pakistani military claims that Baloch militants receive arms and financial support from India but has provided no evidence to support the claim.
In December 2009, Pakistan's newly elected civilian government, in an effort to bring about political reconciliation in the province, passed a package of constitutional, political, administrative, and economic reforms. Nonetheless, doubts persist within Baloch society about the Pakistan government's intentions. Divisions among Baloch nationalists have exacerbated lawlessness and violence in the province.
As the violence in Balochistan has intensified, atrocities have mounted. While the Pakistani military and Baloch militants readily exploit the misery of civilians for their own political purposes, they have failed to address these grievances or to accept responsibility for them.
Recent Extrajudicial Killings in Balochistan
Human Rights Watch has investigated cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Balochistan. Below are recent cases of killings that indicate involvement by the Pakistani military, its intelligence agencies, or the paramilitary Frontier Corps. There has been a notable failure by the federal government in Islamabad and the Balochistan provincial government in Quetta to investigate these cases and hold perpetrators accountable.
Enforced disappearance and killing of Abdul Ghaffar Lango
On December 11, 2009, a group of unknown men abducted Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, outside a hospital in Karachi in Sindh province.
At 3 p.m. that day, Lango was leaving the Institute of Surgery and Medicine, a hospital in Karachi, with his wife, who had just been discharged after surgery. Lango's wife told Human Rights Watch that as the couple reached the main gate, two white Toyota Vigo pickup trucks drove up at high speed in front of them and suddenly stopped. About 10 men in civilian clothes approached the couple. One beat Lango unconscious with the butt of his rifle, and Lango fell to the ground. The men then dragged him into one of the cars and drove away. Lango's wife said there were many witnesses to the incident since it took place in a crowded area in broad daylight.
Later that day, Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction at the Garden police station in Karachi, but the police refused to accept it. A police officer at the station told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and authorities wanted to restrain him from participating in politics. But the police would not provide any information on his whereabouts.
The family filed a petition with the Sindh High Court on January 12, 2010. On January 15, the court ordered the deputy attorney general and advocate general of Sindh to submit a report on Lango's whereabouts within two weeks. On March 3, Sindh Deputy Attorney General Umer Hayat Sindhu told the court on behalf of the director general of the Intelligence Bureau that Lango had not been detained or arrested by the Intelligence Bureau, which, he explained, was "only an intelligence agency that does not detain anyone for interrogation." Police representatives also told the court that Lango was not in their custody. No other security or intelligence authorities reported on Lango's whereabouts.
On July 1, 2011, Lango's body was found in an abandoned hotel near the Lakbado area of the town of Gadani, in Lasbela district of Balochistan. The local police, represented by the station house officer of the Gadani police station, told the local media: "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture. The cause of death was stated to be a severe wound in the head, caused by a hard rod or some other hard or sharp object." Lango appeared to have been recently killed.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Siddique Eido and Yusuf Nazar
Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and Yousaf Nazar, a tailor by profession, were abducted by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010 from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district. Eido and Nazar were returning from Gwadar to their native Pasni after appearing in court in a criminal case lodged against them. Seven other co-accused and four police officers were travelling with them when their van was stopped by three unlicensed vehicles. The assailants, who were in Frontier Corps uniforms, abducted Eido and Nazar at gunpoint in the presence of the police officers. The bodies of both men were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28, 2011. Both bore marks of torture.
In response to the killings and the authorities' failure to seriously investigate the case, HRCP said: "The uniforms of the abductors and the vehicles they had used gave credence to the belief that state agents were involved. Siddique had been abducted in the presence of several policemen, but despite such clear evidence no action was taken to publicly identify abductors or secure release." HRCP added that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" amounted to "collusion" in Eido's killing.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Naseer Kamalan
Naseer Kamalan was abducted at gunpoint on November 5, 2010 from a passenger van on the Makran Coastal Highway near Pasni in Gwadar district. Kamalan's fellow passengers told Human Rights Watch that his abductors were in Frontier Corps uniforms and were driving a jeep of the type commonly used by the Frontier Corps. Kamalan's body was found on January 17, 2011, dumped on the Makran Coastal Highway.
Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Jamil Yaqub
Jamil Yaqub was abducted in the town of Turbat on August 28, 2010 by a group of men in Frontier Corps uniforms, who had arrived in a jeep with military markings and insignia. Family members described to Human Rights Watch how they hid from the Frontier Corps personnel and then watched helplessly as Yaqub was abducted during daylight hours. Yaqub's body, bearing marks of torture, was found on February 10, 2011, on the outskirts of Turbat.
Other Killings Verified by Human Rights Watch
According to eyewitnesses, Hanif Baloch, a Baloch Students Organisation (Azad) (BSO-Azad) activist, was abducted from the town of Hub on July 4, 2011, by armed men in military uniform. His body was found on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body.
On July 6, two bodies bearing multiple bullet wounds were found dumped near Juzak on the outskirts of Turbat in Kech district. Turbat District Headquarters Hospital authorities identified them as Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, son of Muhammad Yousaf, a resident of Go Kurth area of Mand, in Panjgoor district.
On June 18, the BSO-Azad junior joint secretary, Shafi Baloch, was abducted from the Lakhpass area of Mastung district. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that Baloch was going to Mastung from Quetta in a passenger van for medical treatment when uniformed, armed men in three cars made him disembark and abducted him at gunpoint. His bullet-riddled body was found dumped near Mach, in Bolan district, 60 kilometers from Quetta.
On June 1, Prof. Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan in Quetta and an acclaimed writer and poet, was killed after being shot repeatedly by unidentified gunmen on Sariab Road in Quetta. Dashtiyari was the author of several books on Baloch culture and language and was a scholar on Islam. In recent years, he had publicly backed the cause for an armed struggle to achieve an independent Balochistan. No one has claimed responsibility for Dashtiyari's killing.
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