The recent border row between Afghanistan and Pakistan yet again underlines their difficult bilateral relationship.
The Durand Line or the disputed border running 1,500-miles in a difficult terrain is a 19th century demarcation that divided a Pashtun inhabited area. It divided the families and tribes into two different countries, but did little to snap their traditional linkages and belief systems. Thus, the passage of time has done little to extinguish their desire to be united under a common homeland -- Pashtunistan, an idea that stokes fear of disintegration among the Pakistani establishment.
Taliban elements, belonging primarily to the Pashtun ethnic identity receive considerable support from Pashtuns, on both sides of the border. An anathema to the civilized world, Taliban have been provided refuge and protection by the Pashtu tribals, as accorded by the code of “Pushtunwali,” which demands hospitality, honor and protection to the guests. Such hospitality has over the years converted this “ungoverned space” into a sanctuary, to carry out attacks inside the Afghan territory.
In addition to the repeated Taliban forays, the recent incidents of firing of rockets and mortars from within the Pakistani territory into Afghanistan have added fresh complexities to the difficult Af-Pak relations.
Afghan officials say that since late May, some 800 rockets, mortars and artillery shells have been fired from Pakistan into Afghan villages, leaving dozens of civilians dead and injured. Many families in the Kunar province abutting the Af-Pak border have fled their homes. Pakistan, on the other hand, has denied hitting Afghanistan intentionally, but acknowledged its military has been targeting militants to halt cross-border raids and that some rockets may have strayed off course.
Popular angst has resulted in protestations through rallies in capital Kabul and near the border in the city of Asadabad in Kunar, with demonstrators threatening to take matters into their own hands if Afghan forces fail to fight back.
While for many the border rows are part of the normal bickering between the two nations, which aren’t in best terms with each other, at the center of the problem of this is the Pakistan fear of being left out of a negotiated deal with the Taliban.
The increase in tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan comes as the draw down of US forces commences from Afghanistan posing fresh challenges to the project of pacifying the volatile southern and eastern parts of the country. There is a serious search for the political solution to the Afghan war. The Afghan government and the US are seeking to negotiate with the Taliban independently of Islamabad.
In this context, Afghans perceive the incidents of cross border firing as a way of Pakistan demonstrating its ire at being bypassed. For the Pakistani establishment, Taliban remains a “strategic” asset to be positioned in a post US negotiated deal in Kabul. To be left out completely isn’t actually a scenario that is acceptable, even when its relations with the US have ebbed in the post-Osama era.
Pressure on Pakistan has started mounting with the Obama administration suspending hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to its military -- a move that is clearly directed at penalizing Pakistan for denying visa to American military trainers, asking US to vacate the Shamsi airbase in Balochistan and to press its army to fight militants more effectively.
This is further pushing Pakistan to the borders of paranoia. While Pakistan has signaled its willingness to accept the border, Afghanistan refuses to accept any such demarcation.
Further, Pakistan fears Pashtun nationalism raising its ugly head, a nightmare scenario for the Pakistan army. Such an eventuality would trap the army permanently in extinguishing the flames leaving little space and capacity for the Pakistani army to orchestrate a favorable dispensation in Afghanistan.
The project of stabilizing Afghanistan through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban will, thus, continue to be obstructed by an insecure Pakistani establishment. The latter will find ways to position itself as a serious impediment to any reconciliation efforts if it is not involved in the final settlement plan.
(Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, Ph.D., is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore (NUS) in Singapore. She can be reached at: shanthied@gmail.com)