There must be something terribly wrong with the state of Pakistan that in its largest province, state schools no longer recite the national anthem and are giving up on the Pakistani flag.
During the last six months, dozens of Baloch political activists have been reported dead. It is difficult to ascertain exact numbers, given the lack of credible information. But palpable violence defines the state of Balochistan. Baloch activists, leaders and professionals are being targeted by ‘unknown’ forces [read, the all-powerful, all controlling pakistan Army.
The history of Balochistan is stymied by the imposition of a national narrative and its symbolic manifestation remains the refusal of the Khan of Qalat to accede to the new state of Pakistan in 1947.
There is also the story of ‘exploitation’: from the inadequate (and perhaps misappropriated) Sui gas royalties, to the Gwadar port which is not under Baloch control; while the natural wealth of the province is perceived as being looted by ‘foreigners’ [read: the dominant Punjabi population, often wearing the pakistan Army uniform].
Despite the turbulent history of the 1970s and powerful nationalist sentiments, the Mengals and Bugtis attempted to engage with Islamabad to achieve a respectable quantum of autonomy in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s national politics and the ruling elites (largely from the Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) were busy with their own short-term agendas. Thus, the marginalization of the province continued as Pakistan failed to develop a viable model of economic development founded on trade and commerce which may have led to national integration of sorts.
Pakistan Army’s ruthless modernization project bypassed the Sardars, and the Baloch middle classes and instead, drummed up the bogey of ‘foreign intervention’. Worse, it elevated the crisis through the brutal murder of Nawab Bugti.
The civilian government of pakistan is not in charge of Balochistan policy, as the province and its affairs are inextricably linked to the national security paradigm, and hence controlled and dictated by the overlords of pakistan sitting in GHQ Rawalpindi.
Pakistani media and its civil society cannot abandon their duty to highlight the woes of all those Baloch who are being killed, tortured or abducted by the pakistan Army, whose business interests in the region, as stakeholders in the business of extracting minerals and hydrocarbons, makes it imperative for them to retain control over the region, suppressing & snuffing out the freedom movement being waged by the Baloch freedom fighters.
During the last six months, dozens of Baloch political activists have been reported dead. It is difficult to ascertain exact numbers, given the lack of credible information. But palpable violence defines the state of Balochistan. Baloch activists, leaders and professionals are being targeted by ‘unknown’ forces [read, the all-powerful, all controlling pakistan Army.
The history of Balochistan is stymied by the imposition of a national narrative and its symbolic manifestation remains the refusal of the Khan of Qalat to accede to the new state of Pakistan in 1947.
There is also the story of ‘exploitation’: from the inadequate (and perhaps misappropriated) Sui gas royalties, to the Gwadar port which is not under Baloch control; while the natural wealth of the province is perceived as being looted by ‘foreigners’ [read: the dominant Punjabi population, often wearing the pakistan Army uniform].
Despite the turbulent history of the 1970s and powerful nationalist sentiments, the Mengals and Bugtis attempted to engage with Islamabad to achieve a respectable quantum of autonomy in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s national politics and the ruling elites (largely from the Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) were busy with their own short-term agendas. Thus, the marginalization of the province continued as Pakistan failed to develop a viable model of economic development founded on trade and commerce which may have led to national integration of sorts.
Pakistan Army’s ruthless modernization project bypassed the Sardars, and the Baloch middle classes and instead, drummed up the bogey of ‘foreign intervention’. Worse, it elevated the crisis through the brutal murder of Nawab Bugti.
The civilian government of pakistan is not in charge of Balochistan policy, as the province and its affairs are inextricably linked to the national security paradigm, and hence controlled and dictated by the overlords of pakistan sitting in GHQ Rawalpindi.
Pakistani media and its civil society cannot abandon their duty to highlight the woes of all those Baloch who are being killed, tortured or abducted by the pakistan Army, whose business interests in the region, as stakeholders in the business of extracting minerals and hydrocarbons, makes it imperative for them to retain control over the region, suppressing & snuffing out the freedom movement being waged by the Baloch freedom fighters.
