#terrorim The riddle of #pakistan

U.S. relations with Pakistan have been premised on the idea that Pakistan shares U.S. interests in South Asia and is willing and able to cooperate with us. The first idea -- that we share interests -- is patently wrong. The second is increasingly doubtful. What then? What should U.S. policy towards Pakistan be?

For 60 years Pakistan has defined its national interest as the ability to compete with India, retain its hold on part of Kashmir, and advance its standing in the Muslim world. To that end it fought three wars (four if you count the Kargil conflict in 1999) with India since 1947, sought hegemony over Afghanistan as "strategic depth," developed nuclear weapons, and supported a range of militants as proxies against Afghanistan and India. None of this is in America's interest.

In the last ten years we have given billions of dollars of aid and military training to Pakistan to increase its ability to counter militants in the tribal areas-premised, again, on the idea that Pakistan is both willing and able to do so. Here the picture is complex. Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have been killed in conflict with al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, and Pakistan has facilitated the arrest or death of more al Qaeda members than any other country. But the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-I Taiba-the group responsible for the 2009 Mumbi attacks -- seem to remain almost unhindered inside Pakistan.

Now, if the New York Times report is true, Pakistan has signaled that it is no longer willing to tolerate what limited action the United States has allegedly taken against militants in Pakistan. That leaves very little common ground on which the two countries can meet. Almost everything Pakistan does, outside of cooperation against al Qaeda, hurts regional stability and undermines U.S. security.

Our Pakistan policy is hostage to the legacy of alliance and our lack of unilateral capabilities in the region. We would have a freer and stronger hand in South Asia if we built a more independent intelligence capability there. Until that happens (since that takes decades), the United States should gradually complement our Pakistani ties with ties to other countries in the region-which means (sotto voce) India and Afghanistan. Strengthening these relationships-or strengthening them faster than we already are -- would make the United States less reliant on Pakistan, enabling us to develop a clearer, more consistent, and effective policy on nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Another of our key interests is to prevent state failure in Pakistan.