The turning point of state formation in Pakistan was General Zia-ul-Haq's perestroika of key institutions and political processes in accordance with Islamic values. No matter Zia's motives, ‘Islamisation' since rendered Islam into a divisive force and created political space for the rise of religious groups, including the violent ones, some of which morphed into dangerous terror machines that destabilise Pakistan — and the region — and threaten international security. The rising tide of ‘anti-Americanism' and the deepening economic crisis radicalised the youth and spawned a large number of extremist groups, while the state's abdication of its responsibility to strike a balance between human capital and physical capital has been capitalised by the Islamists. In the absence of secular ideologies, Islam became the vehicle for political mobilisation.
The result is plain to see — a growing contestation for the state (and civil society) where the Islamists are wresting the initiative to mobilise the masses. In sum, if Zia's ‘Islamisation' aimed at creating hegemony for the state over society was, arguably, a legitimisation process, the opposite has been achieved. Not only is the state not the only patron of Islamic ideology — a plethora of ‘non-state actors' appeared over the decades — but it is in some retreat and consequently the face of Pakistan's political culture itself is radically changing.
A dangerous point is approaching, a point of no return, with Zia's holy warriors situated in the developing civil society and the democratic regimes either not daring or not bothered about challenging them, and at times even hobnobbing with them for reasons of political expediency. There is no inkling how these cascading tides of religious extremism can be rolled back. Actually, the radical groups seem to be seeking even greater legitimacy by stepping into the neglected areas of social life — education, health care, welfare functions, etc. This, in turn, casts the state in even poorer light.
However, paradoxically, Islam is also proving to be insufficient as a force that can hold Pakistan together, as current developments in Baluchistan, the tribal areas in the northwestern region, and in the metropolis of Karachi would show. All this increasingly raises the question of Pakistan's very survivability as a state. The tragedy of Pakistan is that even in the face of this existential challenge, it is the military establishment that continues to define national interest, and that interest is overwhelmingly defined in terms of confrontation with India, exclusion of civilian government from decision-making on core areas of foreign and security policies, and gaining ‘strategic depth' in Afghanistan.
Powerful forces within the Pakistani state that are even today unable or unwilling to comprehend that we are way past the ‘blame game'. It doesn't help to blame the whole world and pretend that all that is going horribly wrong with Pakistan is because of what Americans have done in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Creating myths about terror machines is dangerous enterprise.
The result is plain to see — a growing contestation for the state (and civil society) where the Islamists are wresting the initiative to mobilise the masses. In sum, if Zia's ‘Islamisation' aimed at creating hegemony for the state over society was, arguably, a legitimisation process, the opposite has been achieved. Not only is the state not the only patron of Islamic ideology — a plethora of ‘non-state actors' appeared over the decades — but it is in some retreat and consequently the face of Pakistan's political culture itself is radically changing.
A dangerous point is approaching, a point of no return, with Zia's holy warriors situated in the developing civil society and the democratic regimes either not daring or not bothered about challenging them, and at times even hobnobbing with them for reasons of political expediency. There is no inkling how these cascading tides of religious extremism can be rolled back. Actually, the radical groups seem to be seeking even greater legitimacy by stepping into the neglected areas of social life — education, health care, welfare functions, etc. This, in turn, casts the state in even poorer light.
However, paradoxically, Islam is also proving to be insufficient as a force that can hold Pakistan together, as current developments in Baluchistan, the tribal areas in the northwestern region, and in the metropolis of Karachi would show. All this increasingly raises the question of Pakistan's very survivability as a state. The tragedy of Pakistan is that even in the face of this existential challenge, it is the military establishment that continues to define national interest, and that interest is overwhelmingly defined in terms of confrontation with India, exclusion of civilian government from decision-making on core areas of foreign and security policies, and gaining ‘strategic depth' in Afghanistan.
Powerful forces within the Pakistani state that are even today unable or unwilling to comprehend that we are way past the ‘blame game'. It doesn't help to blame the whole world and pretend that all that is going horribly wrong with Pakistan is because of what Americans have done in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Creating myths about terror machines is dangerous enterprise.
