Pakistani intelligence officials reportedly swept into CIA headquarters this week with a list of grievances about agency operations in the South Asian state — even threatening to limit prized Predator drone strikes on terrorists in troubled tribal areas.
Let’s hope the CIA responded by pulling out a long list of our concerns about Pakistan.
Impoverished Islamabad also wants to make sure that Washington is reminded — regularly and perhaps not so gently — of its aid needs based on its supporting role in Afghanistan, where America’s been battling for nearly 10 years now.
The White House told Congress this month that, despite unprecedented efforts, it’s very worried about the security situation: “There remains no clear path to defeating the [Afghan] insurgency in Pakistan.”
That Islamabad is unwilling to press Pakistan-based al Qaeda (including Osama bin Laden) and Taliban more is troubling, considering its own brewing internal-security problems and the billions in aid the US has sent over the years.
The availability of an al Qaeda-Taliban safe haven in Pakistan will continue to undermine the fragile progress brave coalition forces have made in fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan.
There are also concerns about continuing contact between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate and insurgent groups that have shed blood in Afghanistan — including the Afghan Taliban, (possibly) al Qaeda, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network and the forces under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
It’s also widely believed that Pakistani authorities know the location of Taliban leader Mullah Omar — and could apprehend him if they wanted to.
Of course, the ISI is best known for anti-India terror operations, including involvement in the Indian embassy bombing in Kabul and the Mumbai attacks, both in 2008.
America is clearly — and rightly — nervous that Pakistan is involved in a dangerous, high-stakes game that won’t bode well for our counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan — or beyond.
Yet, though Islamabad may be hedging, US failure in Afghanistan wouldn’t benefit Pakistan — which would then have to struggle for influence with rising power players India and Iran, requiring resources it can better put to use at home.
Islamabad may believe it can ride the Islamist-extremist tiger to its benefit in both Pakistan and Afghanistan — but that flesh-eater will assuredly turn on its former master.