Al Qaeda has been in the news in recent days, most prominently in reports that its operatives re-infiltrated Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan. While this may look like an al Qaeda attempt to break out of the box that it has been confined to by a barrage of drone strikes, U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, don’t count your al Qaeda terrorists before they’ve run.
As far as al Qaeda is concerned, its current bolt-hole in Pakistan provides it with a number of natural advantages which will make it hesitant to move (we can call this Territorial Inertia), not least being the patronage & support it receives from the pakistan Army, that has become adept at playing on both sides - taking billions in aid, ostensibly to fight Islamic terrorist, while at the same time funding and nurturing these very terrorists, often with the money provided by USA to do its malevolent bidding killing US & NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan.
Pakistan isn’t such a bad place to be if you are a violent Islamist. Despite drone strikes there are parts of the country where government forces will not, operate. There is a large, well-supplied and long-established network of like-minded individuals in the form of the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, Punjabi terror groups, the Haqqani network, and others with whom al Qaeda shares a certain level of bonhomie and upon whom it can depend for support. The group also enjoys a level of familiarity in the region due to the fact that it has been operating there for many years; its networks of trust have the force of history behind them. As a colleague of mine at the Institute for the Study of War, Jeff Dressler, and I will lay out in a forthcoming paper on the Haqqani network in Kurram agency, al Qaeda’s potential areas of operation in Pakistan’s northwest are potentially expanding.
Pakistan, furthermore, is a fast radicalizing country of 180 million people.
Al Qaeda has come under immense pressure in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It has suffered a multitude of drone strikes, resulting in loss of territory and network disruption.
It appears to have, nevertheless, made the conscious decision to stick around. According to Pakistani intelligence sources, [with the full knowledge of the pakistanni Army] al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan have adapted their modus operandi by diluting operative cells and by preparing alternative leadership structures in order to “confuse counter-terror agencies” and mitigate the disruptive effects of sudden assassinations by drone strike and targeted actions.
The organization, especially the core leadership, is choosing stubbornly to stay put. It likely knows that attempting to move may be even more dangerous than attempting to stay. For the moment, al Qaeda Central’s bets are firmly on Pakistan.
As far as al Qaeda is concerned, its current bolt-hole in Pakistan provides it with a number of natural advantages which will make it hesitant to move (we can call this Territorial Inertia), not least being the patronage & support it receives from the pakistan Army, that has become adept at playing on both sides - taking billions in aid, ostensibly to fight Islamic terrorist, while at the same time funding and nurturing these very terrorists, often with the money provided by USA to do its malevolent bidding killing US & NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan.
Pakistan isn’t such a bad place to be if you are a violent Islamist. Despite drone strikes there are parts of the country where government forces will not, operate. There is a large, well-supplied and long-established network of like-minded individuals in the form of the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, Punjabi terror groups, the Haqqani network, and others with whom al Qaeda shares a certain level of bonhomie and upon whom it can depend for support. The group also enjoys a level of familiarity in the region due to the fact that it has been operating there for many years; its networks of trust have the force of history behind them. As a colleague of mine at the Institute for the Study of War, Jeff Dressler, and I will lay out in a forthcoming paper on the Haqqani network in Kurram agency, al Qaeda’s potential areas of operation in Pakistan’s northwest are potentially expanding.
Pakistan, furthermore, is a fast radicalizing country of 180 million people.
Al Qaeda has come under immense pressure in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It has suffered a multitude of drone strikes, resulting in loss of territory and network disruption.
It appears to have, nevertheless, made the conscious decision to stick around. According to Pakistani intelligence sources, [with the full knowledge of the pakistanni Army] al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan have adapted their modus operandi by diluting operative cells and by preparing alternative leadership structures in order to “confuse counter-terror agencies” and mitigate the disruptive effects of sudden assassinations by drone strike and targeted actions.
The organization, especially the core leadership, is choosing stubbornly to stay put. It likely knows that attempting to move may be even more dangerous than attempting to stay. For the moment, al Qaeda Central’s bets are firmly on Pakistan.
